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RUSSIA RUNNING ROGUE?: HOW THE LEGAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RUSSIAN INTERVENTION
IN GEORGIA AND UKRAINE RELATE TO THE U.N.
LEGAL ORDER
Marissa A. Mastroianni*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Following the Russian intervention in Georgia and Ukraine,
much of the international community characterized Russia as a
revisionist power that gives no heed to international law.1 The Russian
invasion provided a flashback to the Westphalian system2 in its fullfledged military assault on Georgia and swift annexation of Crimea.
The times have changed since the creation of the United Nations
(UN), however. The UN Charter was thought “to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war . . . [and] to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed
force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”3 The question
now becomes: how do Russia’s recent interventions relate to the UN
legal order? The UN legal order, which Part II of this Comment defines
in detail, provides states with a legal framework that arises from three
* J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., International Relations and
Political Science, 2012, Lehigh University. I would like to thank Professor Kristen
Boon for her support and invaluable guidance. I would also like to thank Professor
Christopher Borgen for his thoughtful feedback and Michael Spizzuco for his editing
assistance. The views expressed in this Comment are mine alone.
1
In response to Russia’s intervention in Georgia, former U.S. Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice, declared that “Russia’s reputation as a potential partner in
international institutions, diplomatic, political, security, economic, is frankly, in
tatters.” Georgia Conflict: Key Statements, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
7556857.stm (last updated Aug. 19, 2008).
2
The doctrine of state sovereignty derives from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia,
which defined sovereignty as “absolute and perpetual power.” Mikhail Antonov, The
Philosophy of Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Democracy in Russia 5 (Nat’l Research Univ.
Higher School Econ., Working Paper No. WP BRP 24/LAW/2013, 2013).
3
See U.N. Charter preamble, art. 2, ¶ 4 (codifying the prohibition on the use of
force); Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 809 (1970)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul F. Diehl,
Caution in What You Wish For: The Consequences of a Right to Democracy, 48 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 289, 312 (2012).
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sources: (1) the UN Charter; (2) Security Council Resolutions; and (3)
General Assembly Resolutions.
Surprisingly to some, Russia purportedly values adherence to
international law,4 and, consequently, sets forth carefully crafted
arguments to justify its actions in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia’s
perspective on the UN Legal Order brings a level of rigor to
international law that manifests itself in strict interpretations of the
relevant underlying legal principles. The problem remains that many
other states do not share Russia’s stringent perspective.
Like most states in the international system, Russia often behaves
in accordance with its self-interest. On September 3, 2008, thenPresident Dmitry Medvedev announced that Russia had regions of
“privileged interests” that “it will pay particular attention to.”5 Days
later, President Medvedev further explained that Russia was not
drawing spheres of influence, but would rather “work to extend [its]
contacts with those nations with which [it has] traditionally been close,
[and] with whom [it has] had warm relations.”6 Russia’s foreign policy
in 2008 also made it clear that Russia would oppose North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement towards Russian borders,
particularly noting concern with the incorporation of Ukraine and
Georgia.7
Officially, Russia purports to attach great importance to
international law.8 Article 15 of the Russian Constitution states that
“[t]he universally-recognized norms of international law and
international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall
be a component part of its legal system.”9 Additionally, the significance
of international law was one of the five principles on which Russia

4

See Vladimir Baranovsky, Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspective, 2
PUGWASH OCCASIONAL PAPERS, no. 1, 2001, at 13–14.
5
Michael Toomey, The August 2008 Battle of South Ossetia: Does Russia Have a Legal
Argument for Intervention?, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 443, 473 (2009).
6
Id. at 473–74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
See Angelika Nußberger, Russia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT’L
L. ¶ 21 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online) (last updated Oct. 2013) [hereinafter, Russia
Max Planck]; John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault, 93 FOREIGN
AFF., no. 5, 2014, at 77, 79.
8
See Vladimir Putin, Address by President of the Russian Federation (Mar. 18,
2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 [hereinafter, Putin’s
Speech] (discussing how Russia behaved in accordance with international law with
regard to the Crimean Crisis and how Western powers are hypocritical in their
duplicitous perspective on international law); Baranovsky, supra note 4.
9
KONSTITUTSIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15
(Russ.).
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based its foreign policy in 2008.10 This was reiterated in Russia’s
foreign policy in 2013, which was approved by President Vladimir
Putin.11 Russia often makes more of an effort to justify its actions under
international law than many other states, including the United States.12
Russia’s efforts to justify its actions, however, should not be
misconstrued to imply that Russia always obeys international law.
“International law emerges from states’ pursuit of self-interested
policies on the international stage. International law is, in this sense,
endogenous to state interests. It is not a check on state self-interest; it is
a product of state self-interest.”13 One reason for this might be that
Russia’s legal justifications may reflect state interests more so than
strict adherence to international law. Even so, Russia’s legal arguments
are probative in the formation of customary international law.14
Russia’s unilateral attempts to break apart Georgian and Ukrainian
territory represent recent test cases to study Russia’s interpretation of
international law and the law of foreign intervention specifically.
Adherence to the UN legal order15 is important as the system
effectuated many progressive developments in international law. In
1997, Russia and China issued a joint statement calling for a
strengthened UN legal order.16 The two states updated this document
in 2005, recognizing the UN’s role as “irreplaceable” in the
international system.17 So far, the UN legal order has achieved what it
10

The other principles include: (1) promoting a multipolar world; (2)
maintaining friendly relations with other states; (3) paying particular attention to
priority regions; and (4) protecting Russian citizens, no matter where they are. See
Russia Max Planck, supra note 7, at ¶ 1.
11
See Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Concept of the Foreign
Policy of the Russian Federation], UKAZY PREZIDENTA VLADIMIR PUTIN [Decree of
Vladimir Putin] Feb. 12, 2013.
12
In the Kosovo context, Russia invoked legal rhetoric in its public statements
condemning Kosovar independence. The United States and the European Union,
however, did not partake in legal analysis and instead merely repeated Kosovo’s sui
generis and non-precedential character. See Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law
and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of
Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2009).
13
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005).
14
See generally JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH (2d ed., 2006) (examining customary
international law formation).
15
See infra Part II.
16
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, THE POSITIONS OF
RUSSIA AND CHINA AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CRISES,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BRIEFING PAPER (Mar. 2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433800/EXPO-SEDE_NT%282013%29433800_
EN.pdf.
17
Id. (citing China, Russia Issue Joint Statement on World Order, PEOPLE’S DAILY
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set out to do: lessen the likelihood of major wars. The UN legal order
made the prohibition on the threat or use of force non-derogable,
except in particular circumstances.18 The drafters of the UN Charter
desired to create a collective security system to foster international
stability.19 The rise of the UN legal order is associated with the growing
rights of individuals under international law.20 Therefore, the
maintenance of the UN legal order is important to sustain the positive
developments.21 A state acting outside of that system can create
potentially dangerous precedent.
Russia’s voting behavior in the Security Council reflects its
perspective on international law and the UN legal order in particular.
Russia is a Permanent Five (P5) Member in the Security Council and
thereby enjoys veto power over the passage of resolutions. The
Security Council is the cornerstone of the UN’s collective security
system because it is specifically tasked with maintaining international
peace and stability.22 Thus, the Security Council serves as the UN’s
authoritative body interpreting the UN Charter and the law of
international intervention.23 Russia’s conduct and voting record within
the Security Council demonstrates the legal parameters Russia
requires for intervention in foreign states. Because Russia intervened
in Georgia and Ukraine, these parameters must be analyzed to
comprehensively understand the nuance in Russia’s legal arguments

ONLINE, http://en.people.cn/200507/01/eng20050701_193636.html (last updated
July 4, 2005)).
18
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7; U.N. Charter art. 51; ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER,
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, Article 2(4), at 106–28 (Simma
ed., 1994); Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box,
Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 856 (2007)
(explaining how the prohibition on the use of force is a jus cogens norm defined as “a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted”).
19
See Eugenia López-Jacoiste, The UN Collective Security System and its Relationship
with Economic Sanctions and Human Rights, 14 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 273, 275 (2010).
20
See e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., 2008);
60 Ways the United Nations Makes a Difference, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/visitors/shared/documents/pdfs/Pub_Unite
d%20Nations_60%20ways.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2015) (discussing how UN human
rights bodies investigate individual human rights abuses).
21
It is important to note, however, that although the UN legal order is not
synonymous with international law, it incorporates and codifies many legal norms.
22
See U.N. Charter art. 39.
23
The four components of the UN legal order this Comment discusses infra Part
II are all related to the law of intervention. Territorial integrity and the principle of
non-intervention set general standards against intervention.
Self-defense,
responsibility to protect (R2P), and self-determination are reasons why the
international community may intervene in a host state.
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for intervention in both states. This Comment will use Russia’s attitude
towards the recent intrastate conflicts in Libya and Syria as a measure
of Russia’s legal stance on intervention in the Security Council.
Considering the significance Russia attaches to international law,
the question remains: do the legal justifications set forth by Russia
regarding intervention in Georgia and Ukraine fit within the UN legal
order? This Comment answers in the negative with one caveat for
Russian peacekeepers in Georgia,24 and it will discuss how Russia’s
legal arguments for intervention are facially consistent with the UN
legal order. An in-depth analysis, however, yields opposite results. In
addition, this Comment will demonstrate how Russia’s legal
justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine are very
different from the legal stance on intervention that Russia traditionally
adopts within the Security Council.
Part II of this Comment identifies the sources of the UN legal
order and four of its components as a measure for analyzing Russia’s
legal justifications.
These rules include: self-defense, selfdetermination, responsibility to protect25 (R2P), and nonintervention/territorial integrity. Part III analyzes Russia’s legal
perspective in the Security Council. This Part will emphasize Russia’s
traditional non-interventionist voting behavior by examining its action,
or lack thereof, in Libya and Syria. Part IV briefly examines the Kosovo
conflict and Russia’s legal position against intervention and the 2008
Kosovar declaration of independence. It will also show how the
conflict influenced Russia’s attitude on intervention today. Part V
discusses the Russian intervention of Georgia and Ukraine. It
identifies the legal arguments proffered by Russia to justify
intervention and draws commonalities between the two conflicts.
Additionally, Part V will scrutinize whether these legal arguments pass
muster under the four UN legal order components discussed supra. In
conclusion, Part VI integrates the findings in Part V, ultimately
showing that on a surface level, Russia’s legal arguments fit within the
UN legal order. Beyond a surface-level analysis, however, Part VI will
demonstrate that the majority of these justifications are inconsistent
with the UN legal order. Finally, Part VI draws a distinction between
Russia’s legal stance in the Security Council and how Russia operates

24

See infra Part V.
The R2P has not hardened into a rule of international law generally. This
Comment concerns the UN legal order, which is not synonymous with international
law. The rules within the UN legal order certainly overlap with rules under
international law, but vary in some instances like R2P. See infra Part II for a more indepth discussion about R2P and its status in the UN legal order.
25
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independently, displaying the nuance in Russia’s perspective on
international law and the UN legal order.
II. UN LEGAL ORDER
The UN arose out of the chaos created by two world wars and was
established to prevent future war among member states and promote
the peaceful settlement of disputes.26 To promote these goals, the UN
formed the UN legal order, which provided states with a new
framework to operate within. For purposes of this Comment, the UN
legal order is derived from three sources: (1) the UN Charter; (2)
Security Council Resolutions; and (3) General Assembly Resolutions.27
Together, these sources codified pre-existing international law circa
1945 and also fostered the creation of new rules under international
law.
As mentioned supra, this Comment analyzes Russia’s legal
justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine using the four
components infra to measure Russian compliance with the UN legal
order. Sub-part A discusses territorial integrity and the norm of nonintervention. Sub-part B identifies the right of states to act in selfdefense. Sub-part C examines self-determination and its inherent
tension with state sovereignty.28 Finally, Sub-part D addresses the
recently formed R2P framework.
A. Territorial Integrity and Non-Intervention
The territorial integrity of states is the cornerstone of the UN legal
order and is codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.29 Article 2(4)
mandates all member states to “refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”30 The scope of the prohibition
on the use of force is comprehensive in outlawing all uses of physical
force, except in particular cases such as self-defense and humanitarian

26

See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3. See also GERD OBERLEITNER,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT: LAW, PRACTICE, POLICY 40 (2015).
27
Although not binding upon member states, General Assembly resolutions
reflect consensus amongst member states that is important to consider when
identifying customary international law.
28
Pursuant to state sovereignty, the state itself has the ultimate authority over its
domestic affairs. Applied in a conservative manner, it would follow that states are the
only legitimate players in international relations. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
29
See Borgen, supra note 12, at 8.
30
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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intervention.31 Therefore, the ban on the use of force preserves states’
territorial integrity against armed intervention by other states.
Accordingly, the Security Council monopolizes the legitimate use
of force pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security
Council bears the responsibility to address any threats to the peace and
security of the international community.32 The Security Council may
use several tools to resolve a threat to the peace including non-forcible
measures,33 provisional measures,34 and the use of force.35 Pursuant to
Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter, all member states are required
to carry out Security Council decisions.36 Moreover, these decisions
prevail over any other legal obligations.37 Thus, the UN legal order
strongly favors the Security Council to be used as the primary
mechanism for resolving disputes with the use of force.
The norm of non-intervention is also codified in Article 2(7) of
the UN Charter.38 The norm prohibits interference in the domestic
affairs of other states.39 The General Assembly has further defined nonintervention in several declarations including the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.40 Although territorial integrity and non-intervention seem to
outlaw any use of force in international relations, there are certain
circumstances described infra in which those rules are overridden.
B. Self-Defense
Due to the importance of Article 2(4), the UN Charter explicitly
permits the use of force only in situations of Security Council
authorization and self-defense.41 Article 51 preserves the right of
31

See U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51; James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of
the Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215, 229 (2011).
32
See U.N. Charter art. 39.
33
Id. at art. 41.
34
Id. at art. 40.
35
Id. at art. 42.
36
Id. at arts. 25, 48.
37
Id. at art. 103.
38
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”).
39
Id. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV), Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970)
[hereinafter, Friendly Relations Declaration].
40
See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39.
41
Thomas H. Lee, The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect Civilians: A
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member states to unilaterally defend against an attack until the
Security Council takes adequate measures.42 Generally, the application
of Article 51 only arises when four conditions are met: (1) when a
significant armed attack occurs;43 (2) when the act of self-defense
responds to an armed attacker or parties legally responsible for the
attack; (3) when the response is necessary; and (4) when the response
is proportional.44
The International Court of Justice (ICJ or “the Court”) in
Nicaragua v. United States elaborated upon the meaning of an armed
attack in its application of Article 51, concluding that an armed attack
occurs when a state sends either regular forces or armed bands to carry
out an attack in the victim state.45 Even when Article 51 requirements
are met, the right of self-defense only justifies a temporary and limited
unilateral response from the aggrieved state.46 The strict requirements
placed upon Article 51 exemplify the importance that the UN legal
order attaches to the prohibition on the use of force.47
There is a second, more limited, version of self-defense that allows
a state to take unilateral action to protect its nationals: humanitarian
rescue.48 Humanitarian rescue does not derive from the UN legal
order; rather, it comes from customary international law.
Nevertheless, this Comment includes it as a subset of the right to selfdefense because this is one of the legal arguments asserted by Russia
to justify intervention.49
When looking at state practice, it is clear that both before and
after the UN’s creation, international law permitted states to take

Reinterpretation, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 251, 256 (2014).
42
U.N. Charter art. 51.
43
An imminent armed attack also satisfies this requirement. Toomey, supra note
5, at 457 (citing MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER & PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
172–73 (2008)).
44
See id. at 456 (citing O’CONNELL, supra note 43, at 171).
45
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
46
Ved P. Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights
Activists?: The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International Law, 84
AM. J. INT’L L. 494, 496 (1990).
47
See O’CONNELL, supra note 43, 178–79 (discussing how member states in fear of
an armed attack should appeal to the Security Council to remedy perceived danger);
Toomey, supra note 5, at 457.
48
Some authors categorize humanitarian rescue as a form of the responsibility to
protect and a form of humanitarian intervention. See Lee, supra note 41, at 253. This
paper classifies humanitarian rescue as a form of self-defense because it relates greatly
to Russia’s legal arguments for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine.
49
See infra Part IV.

MASTROIANNI (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/1/2016 8:30 PM

COMMENT

607

unilateral action in rescuing its nationals in danger abroad.50 Instead
of an attack on a state’s territory triggering Article 51, this form of selfdefense is asserted on behalf of a state’s nationals in danger in another
state. Humanitarian rescue allows the use of force when undertaken
to protect nationals abroad who face an imminent risk of death.51
Moreover, the aggrieved state must exhaust all peaceful measures to
resolve the situation prior to engaging in humanitarian rescue and act
proportionally.52
C. Self-Determination
One of the principles upon which the UN was founded is the
“principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”53 Selfdetermination means people may “freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development.”54 “People” is a term of art used to identify individuals
that have “a separate culture, a separate language or ethnic origins
different from the majority population in the State.”55
Self-determination for a people living within a state outside of the
decolonization process or foreign occupation entails enjoyment of
minority rights, often referred to as “internal self-determination.”56
Thus, the right to self-determination is fulfilled so long as the minority
group retains the right to speak its own language, participate in the
political community, and practice its culture.57 The right to selfdetermination was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in the Friendly
Relations Resolution passed in 1970.58
When the minority group is not allowed these rights, however,
international law is divided on what the legal remedies entail. In
extraordinary circumstances, independence of oppressed peoples
within a state may be effectuated in accordance with the right to self-

50

See generally Eric Engle, Humanitarian Intervention and Syria: Russia, the United
States and International Law, 18 BARRY L. REV. 129, 154 (2012).
51
Lee, supra note 41, at 274.
52
Id.
53
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
54
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3.
55
Juliane Kokott, Human Rights Situation in Kosovo 19891999, in KOSOVO AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL ASSESSMENT (C. Tomuschat ed., 2002).
56
Borgen, supra note 12, at 9.
57
Id. at 8.
58
See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39.
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determination.59 In the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the ICJ opined that
declarations of independence do not violate international law.60
An inherent tension between territorial integrity and selfdetermination exists within the UN legal order. The UN Charter calls
for both the preservation of state territorial integrity and the
protection of individual rights under self-determination.61 This
tension was understood by the General Assembly when it passed the
Friendly Relations Resolution.62 After describing the right to selfdetermination, the General Assembly was careful to note that
“[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples.”63 Therefore, the right to self-determination is balanced
with the parent state’s territorial integrity.
The next logical step to a declaration of independence is
secession, otherwise known as “external self-determination.” This
occurs when “peoples” break away from the former parent state
seeking to create a new state or to incorporate with another state.
Although not completely analogous to secession, international law
does not authorize declarations of independence, nor does it explicitly
prohibit it.64 Nevertheless, state practice shows that secession is
typically allowed in the decolonization context and where a “people”
is subject to alien subjugation.65
Secessionist disputes are often analyzed under domestic law,66 but
they can also implicate international law in certain circumstances.
These circumstances include: (1) the new entity seeking recognition
as a sovereign state; (2) the Security Council’s determining that the
59

William Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, Penn Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 14-24, 2 (2014).
60
See Timothy William Waters, Plucky Little Russia: Misreading the Georgian War
Through the Distorting Lens of Aggression, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 176, 217 (2013).
61
See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. See also Burke-White, supra
note 59.
62
Burke-White, supra note 59.
63
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39.
64
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 438, ¶ 81 (July
22) [hereinafter, Kosovo Advisory Opinion].
65
In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 222 (Can.); H. Tagliavini,
Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia: Report 17 (2009) [hereinafter,
Tagliavini Report].
66
See Borgen, supra note 12, at 8.
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conflict is a threat to international peace and security; and (3) another
sovereign state intervening in the conflict in support of the
separatists.67 This implies that secession may be carried out in several
ways. One of the least controversial ways to effectuate secession is with
the parent state’s consent.68 Additionally, secession may represent a
UN-supported remedy for a situation that the Security Council deems
to be a threat to international peace and security invoking Chapter VII
authority (binding all member states to this determination).69
The most controversial way to secede is by unilateral remedial
secession, which occurs when neither the parent state nor the UN
consents to secession. One scholar argues that remedial secession
“arises in only the most extreme cases and, even then, under certain
defined circumstances.”70 For example, a parent state committing
genocide or crimes against humanity may trigger the right to
secession.71
Essentially, for secession to rightfully occur, the
circumstances on the ground have to be dire for the separatist
population, and all other means of reconciling the conflict internally
must have been exhausted.72 As discussed supra, territorial integrity of
the states is a cornerstone component of the UN legal order.
Therefore, the secessionist conflict must be extreme to warrant the
dismemberment of a state against its will.
D. R2P
The concept of R2P is comprised of three pillars: (1) all states
have the responsibility to protect civilians within its territory; (2) the
entire international community bears the responsibility to ensure that
67

See id. at 9.
See generally Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 178, 184 (1992).
69
For example, the Security Council deemed the conflict in Darfur a threat to
international peace and security. See S.C. Res. 1945, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1945
(Oct. 14, 2010). In connection with a 2005 peace agreement between the Government
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, voters in a January 2011
referendum overwhelmingly voted for independence, thereby creating the new state
of South Sudan. See Independence of South Sudan, UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE
SUDAN, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/
referendum.shtml. See also G.A. Res. 65/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/308 (Aug. 25,
2011) (admitting the Republic of South Sudan as a UN member state).
70
Borgen, supra note 12, at 9 (citing In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217, 282 (Can.)).
71
See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 3.
72
In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 285–86; Angelika Nußberger, South
Ossetia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e2068?rskey=r4w7nk&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated Jan. 2013).
68
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each state is complying with this obligation; and (3) in cases where a
state fails to comply with such obligation, other states may use any
necessary means to protect the civilians within that state’s territory.73
R2P arose out of the shortcomings of humanitarian intervention
because lawful humanitarian intervention typically requires Security
Council authorization.74 Indeed, the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States
largely prohibited humanitarian concerns as a legal justification for
unilateral military intervention in another state.75 R2P, on the other
hand, places emphasis on the need for civilian protection.76
The doctrine of R2P is a relatively new addition to the UN legal
order. Although not codified in the UN Charter, R2P has made its way
into the UN legal order through Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions.77 R2P was originally adopted by the UN’s Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in preparation for the
2005 World Summit.78 By the end of the 2005 World Summit, more
than 170 states adopted the final report.79 The most notable
applications of R2P are Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973,
73

Lee, supra note 41, at 252.
See Nicar. v. U.S.,1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 134 (June 27) (“[W]hile the United States
might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in
Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure
such respect . . . . The Court concludes that the argument derived from the
preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the
conduct of the United States . . . .”); G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103,
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981). Humanitarian intervention is commonly defined as
“the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization
primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from
widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.” SEAN D.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 11–12 (1996).
The aforementioned
shortcomings refer to the fact that the usage of humanitarian intervention focuses
more upon the legality of intervention instead of focusing upon the need to protect
civilians. See Christian Walter, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: What It Says and What It Does
Not Say, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 17 (2014).
75
See Nicar v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 134.
76
See id.
77
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005);
S.C. Res. 2031, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2031 (Jan. 31, 2013); S.C. Res. 2016, ¶ 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2016 (Oct. 27, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973
(Mar. 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1970, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011);
S.C. Res. 1923, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1923 (May 25, 2010); S.C. Res. 1861, preamble,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1861 (Jan. 14, 2009); S.C. Res. 1856, preamble, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1856 (Dec. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1778, preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept.
25, 2007); S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 15(a)(ii), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007); S.C. Res.
1706, ¶ 12(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
78
See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
79
See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 77.
74
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regarding the conflict in Libya, passed under Chapter VII authority.80
The general consensus is that R2P has not yet formed into
customary international law due to lack of opinio juris and state
practice.81 The UN Secretary-General’s 2012 report classified R2P as a
“political framework based on fundamental principles of international
law for preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”82 Therefore, R2P is not a
binding obligation under international law. At most, R2P can be seen
as a norm of international law.83 Nevertheless, the Security Council
invoked R2P in connection with multilateral intervention.
The status of R2P under international law is controversial to say
the least. The conflict in Libya soured many states due to the high
potential for R2P to be used as a pretext for regime change. For
example, Security Council Resolution 1973 limited the scope of
military operations by excluding “a foreign occupation force” and,
further, implying that intervention was meant to be defensive in
nature—to protect civilians.84
Moreover, the Arab League’s
endorsement of Resolution 1973 was a key reason why Russia and
China did not use their veto powers.85 Russia and China immediately
issued their condemnation when Western powers used Resolution
1973 as a legal justification for offensive military operations and
eventual regime change.86 The perceived pretextual usage of R2P will
80

S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 77; S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 77.
William Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 17, 34 (Jared Genser & Irvin Cotler eds., 2011). Opinio juris
and state practice are two essential elements for a rule to ripen into customary
international law. “State practice” refers to an objective level of consistent state
behavior conforming to the rule. See Assessment of Customary International Law, INT’L
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v1_rul_in_asofcuin#Fn_80_10 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). Opinio juris is a subjective
inquiry assessing whether the state behavior arose from a belief that the state was
legally obligated to take such action. See id.
82
U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
83
Lee, supra note 41, at 277 (“What the Responsibility to Protect is not, however,
is an international legal rule. It has not been codified in an international treaty; it lacks
the state practice and sufficient opinio juris to give rise to customary international law;
and it does not qualify as a general princip[le] of law. Instead, the Responsibility to
Protect is best understood as a norm of international conduct.”) (quoting BurkeWhite, supra note 81, at 34).
84
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 77, ¶ 4; Lee, supra note 41, at 295.
85
Michael Fullilove, China and the United Nations: The Stakeholder Spectrum, 34
WASH. Q. 63, 71 (2011); Lee, supra note 41, at 296.
86
See Lee, supra note 41, at 301; see also Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto
Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan, U.N. Press Release SC/10536
81
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most likely stifle the application of forcible R2P in the near future.87
III. RUSSIA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
As a P5 Member, Russia wields significant influence within the
Security Council. Many scholars argue that Russia’s prominent status
within the UN is one reason why Russia holds the UN legal order in
high regard.88 Due to Russia’s P5 status, it is important to understand
Russia’s voting position in order to understand the potential, or lack
thereof, for Security Council action in the future. As discussed supra,
the Security Council is the body within the UN legal order tasked with
maintaining international peace and stability.89 Through the passage
of resolutions, the Security Council determines when intervention is
warranted in other states’ domestic affairs. Thus, its decisions reflect
the law of intervention as agreed upon by the voting member states. A
member state’s vote and subsequent legal explanation becomes highly
relevant in determining not only that state’s view on the law, but also
the UN legal order’s content and scope.
As a preliminary matter, when a P5 Member abstains from a vote,
it “withholds from the proposed action the legitimacy that an
affirmative vote from it provides.”90 Thus, a Russian abstention
allowing the Security Council action to proceed should not be
misconstrued as Russian support.91 As with every member state, the
voting decision is context dependent and fact specific. This is
emphasized in Russia’s justification for abstaining on Resolution 1284,
regarding weapons monitoring in Iraq.92 Specifically, the Russian
representative noted that “the fact that his country did not block this
imperfect resolution did not mean that it was obliged to go along with
a forceful implementation of it.”93 Therefore, abstentions and vetoes
are similarly considered as negative votes. Voting patterns within the
Security Council and the associated legal justifications set forth by
member states indicate, in part, state views on intervention in the
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm.
87
See Lee, supra note 41, at 302.
88
See Andrew Monaghan, Calmly Critical: Evolving Russian Views of US Hegemony, 29
J. STRATEGIC STUD. 987–1013 (2006).
89
See U.N. Charter art. 39.
90
PHIL C. W. CHAN, A Keen Observer of the International Rule of Law?, in CHINA, STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 238, 259 (2015).
91
See id.
92
S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (Dec. 17, 1999).
93
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Establishes New Monitoring
Commission for Iraq Adopting Resolution 1284 (1999) By Vote Of 11-0-4, U.N. Press
Release SC/6775 (Dec. 17, 1999).
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context of the UN legal order. Identifying a state’s legal stance on
intervention will juxtapose how it behaves as a member state within the
UN legal order and its unilateral conduct outside of the UN.
Analyzing Russia’s voting behavior and legal justifications for its
votes is necessary to determine the parameters for Russian
intervention. An understanding of the circumstances required for
Russia to support collective Security Council action will provide a full
picture of Russia’s decision to unilaterally intervene in Georgia and
Ukraine. Part VI will show that Russia’s legal position on intervention
in the Security Council stands in seeming contradiction with its legal
arguments for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine.
This section of the Comment will use the recent intrastate
conflicts in Libya and Syria as measures for Russia’s voting pattern and
legal attitude regarding international intervention. It is important to
note, however, that Russia’s decision to support or oppose any given
Security Council resolution does not take place in a vacuum. Russia’s
voting behavior reflects some combination of Russia’s self-interest, the
unique characteristics of the conflict, and Russia’s legal perspective on
the UN legal order. With regard to Libya and Syria, Part A will discuss
Russia’s action, or inaction, as a P5 Member in the Security Council.
Then, Part B will draw common trends in Russia’s voting pattern and
associated legal reasoning.
A. Russia’s Evolving Voting Pattern Emerging from the Violent
Intrastate Conflicts in Libya and Syria
As stated supra, the large-scale interstate violence of two world
wars led to the creation of the UN and the Security Council. In the
past few decades, however, the growing rate of intrastate conflicts has
forced the UN—and in particular, the Security Council—to adapt to
this new reality and make more decisions regarding intervention in
internal conflicts with human rights abuses.94 Libya and Syria
represent two prime test cases to analyze the legal position on
intervention adopted by Russia in the Security Council. The violent
intrastate conflicts in Libya and Syria originated from political
instability and oppressive government regimes that systemically
committed human rights violations. Russia’s decision to support or
oppose resolutions regarding these conflicts exemplifies its overall
view on intervention and what parameters must be met to justify

94

C.f. Katie Lynch, China and the Security Council: Congruence of the Voting Between
Permanent Members, 5 CHINA PAPERS 2009, at 26–27 (2009) (arguing that China and
Russia cooperate more often than any other states in the Security Council).
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violating territorial integrity.95 Sub-part 1 will analyze Russia’s conduct
regarding Libya, and Sub-part 2 will discuss how Russia reacted to the
civil war in Syria.
1.

Libya

Spurred by the Arab Spring, widespread political protest against
Colonel Qaddafi’s oppressive regime began in February 2011.96 In
response to the growing unrest, the Qaddafi regime used military force
to quell protesters.97 The Arab League swiftly condemned this violence
against Libyan civilians;98 as a result, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1970, imposing against the Libyan government a
sanctions regime consisting of an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an
assets freeze.99 As the situation worsened, the Arab League endorsed
the imposition of a no-fly zone to prevent the Libyan government from
using military aircrafts against civilians.100 Taking up the call, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which invoked Chapter VII
authority in imposing the no-fly zone and authorized member states to
“take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under the threat of attack.”101 Despite supporting
Resolution 1970, Russia and China abstained from voting for
Resolution 1973.102
Air strikes led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France began in March 2011 to dismantle the Qaddafi regime.103
Shortly thereafter, the NATO took over military operations to enforce
Resolution 1973.104 The NATO-led military intervention ended in
October 2011, and the Qaddafi regime was effectively ousted from
power.105

95

See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
See
Chronology
of
Events:
Libya,
SECURITY
COUNCIL
REP.,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/libya.php?page=9 (last updated
Nov. 30, 2015).
97
See id.
98
Id.
99
See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 77.
100
Arab League Backs Libya No-Fly Zone, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12723554.
101
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 77, at ¶ 4.
102
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’
over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in
Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
103
See Chronology of Events: Libya, supra note 96.
104
Id.
105
See id.
96
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Russia’s affirmative support for Resolution 1970 turned into nonsupport when Russia abstained from voting for Resolution 1973.
During the time preceding Resolution 1973, the international
community became more divided, especially with the African Union
explicitly opposing any NATO intervention.106 Russia’s Permanent
Representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, elaborated upon Russia’s
legal reasoning for abstention. Mr. Churkin noted that the resolution
“could potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.”107
Instead of involving military force, Russia advocated an immediate
ceasefire to secure the civilian population.108 Shortly after the NATO
intervention began, leaders of Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and
India expressed severe criticism towards the offensive military
intervention, arguing that Resolution 1973 was “being interpreted
arbitrarily.”109 Russia’s pre-passage objections to Resolution 1973
seemed to come true; Russia argued that NATO acted outside of the
scope of Resolution 1973 by engaging in offensive military aircraft
action that effectively ousted the Qaddafi regime.110
2.

Syria

The first major protests sparking the current civil war in Syria
began in Damascus in March 2011.111 The Assad regime used military
force against civilian protesters in May 2011. Only several months
later, the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership due to the
violence committed against the civilian population.112 In October
2013, the Assad regime engaged in the “Starvation Until Submission
Campaign,” and later that year, UN inspectors found clear evidence
that sarin gas was used against civilians.113 The chaos in Syria multiplied
with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).114 As of
106

See Enrico Carisch & Loraine Rickard-Martin, Global Threats and the Role of United
Nations Sanctions, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG INT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2011).
107
U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011).
108
See id.
109
Chronology of Events: Libya, supra note 96.
110
Lee, supra note 41, at 301.
111
See Anup Kaphle, Timeline: Unrest in Syria, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2014),
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/timeline-unrest-in-syria/207/.
112
See Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria over Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/world/middleeast/
arab-league-votes-to-suspend-syria-over-its-crackdown-on-protesters.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0.
113
Rep. of U.N. Human Rights Council, Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, 25th Sess., July 15, 2013–Jan. 20, 2014, ¶¶ 13, 127–29, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014).
114
See Ben Hubbard, ISIS Tightens Its Grip with Seizure of Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES
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February 2015, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated the
death toll to be approximately 210,000 after almost four years of civil
war.115
In light of the dire circumstances on the ground, the Security
Council action thus far has been meek, partly because of Russia.
Resolution 2043 created the United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria (UNSMIS), composed of 300 unarmed military observers.116
Moreover, Resolution 2118 ordered the Assad regime to destroy all
chemical weapons within its possession.117 In response to the
“Starvation Until Submission Campaign,” Resolution 2139 demanded
all parties to allow civilians to move freely throughout the country and
called for the delivery of humanitarian aid.118 By unanimous vote and
without Syria’s consent, the Security Council passed Resolution 2165,
which authorized UN access to the Syria-Iraq border for humanitarian
aid delivery.119
The resolutions passed in response to the Syrian conflict are only
part of the story. Russia, along with China, vetoed a total of four
resolutions regarding Syria.120 In October 2011, Russia and China
jointly vetoed a draft resolution that attributed the atrocities to the
Assad regime and commanded the regime to cease all hostilities.121
Russia vetoed the resolution because it did not “agree with this
Mr. Churkin
unilateral, accusatory bent against Damascus.”122
explained that Russia introduced an alternative draft resolution
instead focusing on Syria’s territorial integrity and the principle of
non-intervention.123 In justifying Russia’s veto for another draft
resolution in 2012, Mr. Churkin noted that some member states “have
undermined any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime
(Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/middleeast/
isis-militants-capture-air-base-from-syrian-government-forces.html.
115
Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Syria Death Toll Now Exceeds 210,000: Rights Group, REUTERS
(Feb. 7, 2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/07/us-mideastcrisis-toll-idUSKBN0LB0DY20150207.
116
S.C. Res. 2043, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012).
117
See S.C. Res. 2118, ¶¶ 2–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
118
See S.C. Res. 2139, ¶¶ 5–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014).
119
See S.C. Res. 2165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2165 (July 14, 2014).
120
See Security Council—Veto List, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).
121
S.C., France, Germany, Portugal, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland: Draft Resolution, ¶¶ 1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011).
122
U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011).
123
Id.; see also S.C., Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United
States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012).
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change, encouraging the opposition towards power, indulging in
provocation and nurturing the armed struggle.”124 Later that same
year, Russia vetoed yet another draft resolution indicating that Western
states would “use the Security Council of the United Nations to further
their plans of imposing their own designs on sovereign States.”125
Specifically, Russia refused to support the draft resolution that would
only impose sanctions upon the Assad regime, but did not take foreign
military intervention off of the table.126
Finally, Russia vetoed a May 2014 draft resolution that sought to
refer the conflict to the International Criminal Court (ICC).127 Mr.
Churkin reiterated Russia’s beliefs that only locally-based solutions
would end the conflict and that the draft resolution “reveals an attempt
to use the ICC to further inflame political passions and lay the ultimate
groundwork for eventual outside military intervention.”128 It is also
worth noting that Russia has several self-interested reasons for refusing
to permit intervention in Syria. First, Russia maintains a naval base in
Syria, which is its “last foreign military base outside the former Soviet
Union.”129 Additionally, Syria buys significant amounts of military
exports from Russia, thereby providing the country with much needed
revenue.130
124

U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6711 (Feb. 4, 2012).
U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810 (July 19, 2012);
see also S.C., France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc.
S/2012/538 (July 19, 2012).
126
See U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6810th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810 (July 19,
2012).
127
S.C., Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria,
Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Demark, Estonia, England, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia,
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico,
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft
Resolution, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014).
128
U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7180th mtg. at 12–13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7180 (May 22,
2014).
129
Max Fisher, The Four Reasons Why Russia Won’t Give up Syria, No Matter What
Obama Does, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2013/09/05/the-four-reasons-russia-wont-give-up-syria-nomatter-what-obama-does/.
130
Id.; see also Ben Piven, Russia Expands Military Footprint Abroad with New Syria Base,
ALJAZEERA AM. (Sept. 18, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/
articles/2015/9/18/russia-foreign-military-bases.html.
125
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B. Russia’s Legal Stance on Intervention as a P5 Member
The term “intervention” in the Russian language refers only to the
use of armed force.131 Other forms of intervention, such as economic
aid or political support, are referred to as “non-interference.”132
Therefore, the mere use of the term “intervention” implies a more
aggressive behavior when interpreted by Russians than it otherwise
would when interpreted by people of other ethnicities and cultures.133
Historically, Russia maintained a negative perspective on
humanitarian intervention. Between 1918 and 1922, the Russian
homeland suffered attacks from fourteen different states.134 Russians
characterized World War I as the war against Nazi interventionists.135
In the Soviet context, the term “intervention” was associated with acts
that violated international law by undermining state sovereignty.136
Due to being a victim of intervention, Russia developed a stricter
notion of state sovereignty rendering any claim for intervention
suspect.137
The fact that Russia itself is experiencing separatist movements
within its borders also speaks towards Russia’s apprehension of
humanitarian intervention. Russia may fear foreign states intervening
in its own domestic affairs and limiting its ability to quash separatist
movements.138 For example, Chechnya is one of the bloodiest
secessionist movements within Russia. In Isayeva v. Russia and Isayeva
v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights held that Russia
breached the European Convention on Human Rights due to its
indiscriminate use of heavy military weaponry against civilians in
Chechnya.139 Therefore, Russia has an interest in objecting to
humanitarian intervention on behalf of separatist movements.
Russia’s P5 status within the Security Council provides it with great
authority to decide whether the UN should authorize foreign
131

See Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 14.
See id.
133
Indeed, the common understanding of “intervention” has changed over time
by becoming highly associated with military intervention. See KOFI ATTA ANNAN, THE
QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 3, 9 (United
Nations Dep’t of Pub. Info. 1999).
134
See Baranovksy, supra note 4, at 12.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 13.
137
See id. at 13–14.
138
See Lynch, supra note 94.
139
Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 191 (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68381; Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00,
57948/00,
57949/00,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.,
at
¶
195
(2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379.
132
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intervention. As discussed supra, Russia often makes an effort to justify
its actions under international law.140 Thus, analyzing the ways in which
Russia legally justifies its voting behavior is crucial in gaining the full
picture of Russia’s legal perspective on both foreign intervention and
the UN legal order. Russia’s voting pattern and associated legal
reasoning in the recent intrastate conflicts in Libya and Syria serve as
measurement for Russia’s overall legal stance.141
Russia’s overarching legal position on humanitarian intervention
is founded upon its great deference for state sovereignty,142 the
principle of nonintervention, and territorial integrity.143 Russia fosters
close ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a group of states
that represents developing countries within the UN and objects to
foreign intervention without host state consent.144 Moreover, Russia
seems to value diplomacy over military force in ending violent
conflict.145 Indeed, for many conflicts, Russia believes that intervention
will only create further unrest.146 As an over-arching principle and
pursuant to the UN Charter, Russia believes that the Security Council
is the only body with the authority to sanction foreign intervention.147
140

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
It is important to note, however, that Russia does not adhere to one legal policy
per se because every conflict is different. This Section merely aims to identify Russia’s
general legal stance for foreign intervention.
142
In light of Russia experiencing its own separatist movements, like in Chechyna,
it makes sense why Russia highly values state sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention. In a strict sense, state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention
both preclude intervention in the domestic affairs of states without their consent.
Therefore, Russia would not need to worry about outside intervention in its own quest
to quell internal unrest. See Saira Mohamed, Shame in the Security Council, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1191, 1246 (2013); see also Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 25–26.
143
See Mohamed, supra note 142; DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF
THE UNION, supra note 16, at 15. For example, Russia argued that the only way the
Security Council could establish an observer force in the Palestinian territories was
with the consent of Israel and Palestine. See Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Observer Mission for Occupied Palestinian
Territories, U.N. Press Release SC/6976 (Dec. 18, 2000).
144
See Mohamed, supra note 141, at 1247; The Non-Aligned Movement: Description and
History, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, http://www.nam.gov.za/background/
history.htm (last updated Sept. 21, 2001).
145
See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, supra note 16,
at 15. This is part of the reason why Russia does not generally view intrastate conflicts
as posing a threat to international peace and security, thereby not warranting Security
Council action.
146
See Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 19.
147
See id. at 20; Gilbert Rozman, Russian Repositioning in Northeast Asia: Putin’s Impact
and Current Prospects, in RUSSIA’S PROSPECTS IN ASIA 63, 69 (Stephen J. Blank ed., 2010)
(“The two also share a firm commitment to leave with the UN Security Council the
sole authority to address questions or the use of force beyond one’s national
141

MASTROIANNI (DO NOT DELETE)

620

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/1/2016 8:30 PM

[Vol. 46:361

Often, Russia will forego the state consent requirement when a
regional organization endorses intervention.148
In applying these generalized legal positions to Libya, Russia’s
change of heart in the Security Council is telling. In its positive vote
for Resolution 1970, Russia (along with China) “did not see any reason
not to go with what the Arab League wanted,”149 showing that Russia
does value regional organization support when making its decision to
support a resolution. The tides began to turn when Russia grew
suspicious that Western states would militarily intervene in Libya and
voiced its objections that Resolution 1973 was worded too broadly.150
Staying true to its preference for diplomatic solutions over military
intervention against host state consent, Russia instead proposed that
the Security Council should call for a ceasefire in Libya.151
The aftermath of NATO intervention in Libya greatly influenced
Russia’s legal position in the Security Council on intervention. As
discussed supra, Russia voiced its criticism about the regime change
effectuated by Resolution 1973 and the subsequent NATO
intervention.152 Inherently, the air-based NATO military campaign
against the Qaddafi regime represented a severe intrusion on Libya’s
state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are two legal principles
that Russia highly values. In fact, Mr. Churkin stated that Russia was:
[C]oncerned at the trend towards an arbitrary interpretation
of the norms of international humanitarian law for the
protection of civilians in armed conflict and their application
to the responsibility to protect. It is unacceptable to use
issues related to the protection of civilians and overall human
rights to achieve political goals, especially as a pretext for
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States.153
Therefore, Russia seems much more cautious about invoking R2P in
any Security Council action due to the Libyan regime change.154 It is
notable, however, that despite Russia’s criticism of R2P, Russia does
recognize that a state has a legal duty to protect civilians.155 Russia
borders.”).
148
See Mohamed, supra note 142, at 1247.
149
Lee, supra note 41, at 298.
150
See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17,
2011).
151
See id.
152
See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
153
U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 6903rd mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6903 (Jan. 21, 2013).
154
See, e.g., David Rieff, Opinion, R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all.
155
See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council, Expressing Deep Regret
over Toll on Civilians in Armed Conflict, Reaffirms Readiness to Respond to Their
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differs from other states because it believes that the international
community should primarily assist states in maintaining this duty.156
The aftermath of Libya has, in part, influenced Russia’s legal
justifications in vetoing four draft resolutions on the Syrian civil war.
The violence in Syria is much greater than the rebellion in Libya, yet
Russia (and China as well) refuses to support similar Security Council
action.157 As indicated in Russia’s legal justifications for its negative
votes, Russia was very concerned with adhering to Syria’s territorial
integrity and the principle of non-intervention.158 Moreover, Russia
made it clear that it would not allow other member states to use
Security Council authorization to effect regime change and, therefore,
adopted a conservative approach in choosing the language to be
included in any successful resolution.159
Overall, Russia adheres to more conservative legal rules in the
Security Council by requiring certain parameters before offering its
support for foreign intervention. These requirements for intervention
of course are not only products of Russia’s legal view on intervention,
but also are influenced by other political factors. Although Russia’s
perspective may raise controversy and seem like an outlier compared
to other member states, Russia does not ignore the principles
underlying the UN legal order. Indeed, Russia grounds its legal
position using foundational elements of the UN legal order such as
territorial integrity and the principle of non-intervention.

Deliberate Targeting, U.N. Press Release SC/9786 (Nov. 11, 2009) (discussing how
Mr. Churkin stated that the “protection of civilians was primarily the responsibilities
of States involved in conflict, and the actions of the international community should
be aimed at assisting national efforts”).
156
See id.
157
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, supra note 16, at
6.
158
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
159
See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SECESSION IN KOSOVO
AND HOW IT INFLUENCED RUSSIA’S LEGAL RHETORIC
Kosovo’s independence160 from Serbia heavily influenced Russia’s
legal justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. Sub-part
A will briefly introduce the conflict’s factual background. Sub-part B
discusses Russia’s opposition to NATO intervention. Sub-part C
discusses the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo and the legal
arguments set forth by Russia. Finally, Sub-part D analyzes how the
situation in Kosovo affected Russia’s legal stance towards the UN legal
order.
A. The Kosovo Conflict
Most of Kosovar’s population is ethnic Albanian with a Serb
minority.161 Kosovo enjoyed autonomy under the Federal Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia (FSRY) as a province of the Serbian republic.162
Under the FRSY’s legal framework, only republics were entitled to
statehood after its dissolution.163 Along with the crumbling Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (“Soviet Union”), the FRSY began to
disintegrate in 1991 with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia
declaring independence from Yugoslavia.164 Serbia and Montenegro,
however, continued the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).165
Subsequently, Kosovo first declared independence from Yugoslavia on
September 21, 1991, which had little success as only Albania
recognized Kosovo’s independence.166
160

Kosovo’s status as an independent state remains hotly contested to this day. See,
e.g., Jure Vidmar, Kosovo: Unilateral Secession and Multilateral State-Making, in KOSOVO: A
PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 143, 177
(James Summers ed., 2011) (arguing that Kosovo fails to satisfy statehood
requirements). In fact, only ninety-six states recognize Kosovo as an independent
state. Countries that Have Recognized the Republic of Kosovo, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.,
http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
161
Demographic Changes of the Kosovo Population 19482006, STATISTICAL OFFICE OF
KOSOVO (Feb. 2008), https://ask.rks-gov.net/ENG/pop/publications/doc_details/
521-demographic-changes-of-the-kosovo-population-19482006?tmpl=component&format=raw.
162
James Summers, Kosovo, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 235, 236 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2014).
163
Id. at 237–38.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. See also European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the
Guidelines of the Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1485,
1485–86 (1992) (explaining how the European Community recognized the
independence of only former Yugoslav republics).
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Serbia began a “Serbianization” campaign in Kosovo to solidify
authority over the region,167 and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
commenced guerilla insurgency against Serbia.168 In response, Serbia
commenced military operations in Kosovo, resulting in widespread
atrocities against ethnic Albanians.169 The Serbs committed ethnic
cleansing against ethnic Albanians and displaced about 200,000
Kosovars in the process.170
After negotiations to end the violence failed, and amidst
continued ethnic cleansing, NATO began an airstrike campaign
against the FRY.171 While NATO did not have Security Council
authorization to intervene,172 it justified the use of force as “necessary
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.”173 Shortly thereafter, the armed
conflict concluded with a peace agreement.174
The Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which created a
framework for the international administration of Kosovo.175 The
Security Council established a peacekeeping mission, the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to create a stable political
framework.176 This interim regime177 permitted Kosovo to exercise selfgovernment within the territorial integrity of the FRY, while
simultaneously prohibiting the FRY from exercising sovereignty over
the region.178 Moreover, Resolution 1244 established a process to
determine the final status of Kosovo, but did not include many details
on how this would occur.179 The UN administration lasted for several
years, but officials announced in December 2007 that the negotiation
process for determining Kosovo’s final legal status had resulted in an
impasse.180

167

See Kokott, supra note 55, at 15–26.
Summers, supra note 162, at 238.
169
Borgen, supra note 12, at 3.
170
See ALEX J. BELLAMY, KOSOVO AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 120–55 (2002); TIM
JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 140–71 (1st ed. 2000).
171
Waters, supra note 60, at 216.
172
This was due to Russia’s and China’s veto power and political opposition to such
intervention.
173
See Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org. (NATO), Press Statement by Dr. Javier
Solana, Secretary General of NATO (Mar. 23, 1999).
174
Summers, supra note 162, at 240.
175
See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
176
See id. ¶ 9.
177
Id. ¶ 10.
178
Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, pmbl.
179
See id. ¶ 11.
180
Borgen, supra note 12, at 4.
168
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Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on February 17,
2008 and claimed that it had reached statehood.181 A minority of states
recognized Kosovo as a state shortly thereafter.182 Upon Serbia’s
request in 2008, the UN General Assembly asked the ICJ to provide an
Advisory Opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s independence (“Kosovo
Advisory Opinion”).183 The ICJ delivered its ten-to-four majority
opinion on July 22, 2010 and announced that Kosovo’s declaration of
independence did not violate international law.184 The ICJ’s decision,
however, is silent as to any potential right to secede under
international law.185
B. Russia’s Reaction to NATO Intervention in Kosovo
As discussed supra, Russia exhibits caution towards intervention
and, more often than not, shows great deference to the principle of
non-intervention.186 The legal parameters187 for Russia to support
intervention in the Security Council were all at play in the NATO
intervention in Kosovo. Russia saw Yugoslavia (Serbia’s predecessor)
“as the victim of aggression from powerful nations, the object of unfair
treatment on the part of those who are stronger and more numerous
and can impose their will on one who is weaker.”188 The effectiveness
of humanitarian intervention was also brought into question because
approximately 350,000 Serbs fled Kosovo immediately following the
arrival of NATO-led forces amidst increasing reports of violence
against Serbs.189 This example illustrates why Russia often argues that
foreign intervention may worsen an intrastate conflict instead of
181

See Kosovo Declaration of Independence, Feb. 17, 2008, reprinted in 47 I.L.M.
467, 471 (2008).
182
Summers, supra note 162, at 244.
183
G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008).
184
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J.403, ¶ 84 (July 22).
185
See id. ¶ 56. Many scholars criticized the Court for not reaching the substantive
issue of whether a right to secede exists under international law. See, e.g., Anne Peters,
Has the Advisory Opinion’s Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not Contrary
to International Law Set An Unfortunate Precedent?, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE
KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION 291, 299 (Marko Milanovi’c & Michael Wood eds., 2015);
Timothy William Waters, Misplaced Boldness: The Avoidance of Substance in the
International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Opinion, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 267, 267
(2013).
186
See supra Part III.
187
See supra notes 142–48 and accompanying text.
188
Baranovsky, supra note 4, at 22 (citing S. Startsev, “Balkanskiy pristup
geopolitichesogo darvinizma,” Osobaya papka NG (special appendix to Nezavisimaya
gazeta), no. 1, Apr. 1999, 12).
189
Id. at 24 (citing Kosovo-eto, napomnim, chast Yugoslavii, Trud, 1 Apr. 2000 p.
4).
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curtailing the violence.190
In addition, Russia is sensitive to NATO expansion. States are
often more concerned with perceived threats close to home rather
than events happening farther abroad.191
Accordingly, NATO
enlargement to states near Russian borders becomes a direct security
threat to Russian territory. Russia has clearly opposed NATO
enlargement and refuses to allow neighboring states to turn into
Western hubs.192 Following the 1995 NATO air-campaign against
Bosnian Serbs, “Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, ‘[t]his is the first
sign of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian
Federation’s border . . . . The flame of war could burst out across the
whole of Europe.’”193 In light of Russia’s sensitivity to NATO
expansion, many Russians believe that purported human rights
considerations used to justify intervention are a mere pretext for larger
political goals.194
C. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion
Russia vehemently opposed Kosovar independence. Russia’s legal
arguments are comprehensively reflected in its written submission to
the ICJ filed in connection with the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.195 These
arguments are largely based upon state sovereignty, the norm of nonintervention, and high respect for territorial integrity.196 Ultimately,
Russia rejected any Kosovar claim for remedial secession from Serbia.197
Before delving into its legal arguments, it is key to note that Russia
made several factual observations about the Kosovo conflict. Overall,
Russia did not see the Kosovo conflict as an ongoing one. Since
Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992,198 the dissolution was irrelevant to the
Kosovar claim for independence.199 Russia also separated the
19981999 crises, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of thousands
of Kosovar Albanians, from the period after Resolution 1244 where
190

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See Mearsheimer, supra note 7, at 81–82.
192
Id. at 77.
193
Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
194
See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Antonov, supra note 2, at 22.
195
See Written Statement by the Russian Federation, Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory
Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (Apr. 16, 2009).
196
Id. ¶ 21.
197
Id. ¶ 103.
198
See generally Danilo Türk, Recognition of States: A Comment, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 66
(1993).
199
See Written Statement by the Russian Federation, supra note 195, ¶¶ 44–45.
191
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Kosovars were “not being exposed to risks of discrimination.”200
Therefore, Russia argued that the ICJ should only consider the
February 2008 conditions in Kosovo for any possible claim of secession
from Serbia, and that any atrocities committed between 1998 and 1999
were no longer relevant to the inquiry.201 The reasoning behind this
legal argument was that Kosovo had been under international
administration for several years and Serbia no longer posed any threat
to Kosovars.202
As a preliminary matter, Russia asserted that the ICJ should use
Security Council Resolution 1244 as the “special legal regime upon
which the Court can base its consideration of the request.”203 Russia
found the language affirming Serbia’s territorial integrity within
Resolution 1244 particularly valuable in determining whether Kosovo
had the right to secede.204 Additionally, Resolution 1244 never
recognized secession as a possible outcome.205 Thus, Resolution 1244
created a strong presumption in favor of maintaining Serbia’s
territorial integrity.206
Russia also attacked Kosovo’s February 2008 Declaration of
Independence. Russia classified territorial integrity as “an unalienable
attribute of a State’s sovereignty.”207 Russia recognized, however, that
a state’s territorial integrity may be overridden if it refuses to respect
the self-determination of its “peoples.”208 Russia qualified this
concession as only applying to extreme conditions where the existence
of a “people” is at risk.209
Russia also curiously noted that self-determination had not been
invoked as a legal justification for intervention in Kosovo until years
after the 1999 air-strike campaign. Therefore, self-determination
should not have been a legal basis for secession in 2008.210 Russia
further argued that the 1999 NATO intervention was not based upon
the Kosovar’s right to self-determination, but instead was taken for
200

Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶ 47.
202
Id. ¶¶ 51–52.
203
Id. ¶ 28.
204
Id. ¶ 54.
205
Written Statement by the Russian Federation, supra note 195, ¶ 56.
206
Id. ¶ 58.
207
Id. ¶ 77.
208
Id. ¶ 88. This is based upon the Savings Clause in the Friendly Relations
Declaration that has been construed to permit secession under certain conditions. See
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39.
209
Id. ¶ 87.
210
Id. ¶¶ 92, 94.
201
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humanitarian purposes.211 Since Resolution 1244 addressed human
rights abuses, this foreclosed any right to remedial secession.212 Finally,
Russia noted how different the new Serbian state was from its
predecessor, the FRY.213 Serbia adopted democracy and human rights
law.214 Therefore, the Kosovars no longer faced any threat of force or
severe oppression, foreclosing any right to secession.215
D. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion’s Impact on Legal Rhetoric
Similar to domestic law, ICJ cases often serve as precedent for
future disputes, despite Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, which
states that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”216 As
opposed to traditional judgments between parties, the ICJ may also
give advisory opinions on specific legal questions.217 An advisory
opinion is technically not binding upon any party, but in reality carries
heavy legal weight.218 International organizations are the only parties
that enjoy the right to seek advisory opinions from the ICJ.219
Despite considering Kosovo’s declaration of independence in an
advisory capacity, some states have regarded the ICJ’s judgment as
precedent. Notwithstanding having NATO membership, however,
Western powers, such as the United States, assert that Kosovo is sui
generis and that no precedential value may be derived from the
outcome.220 Western powers will likely continue to adopt such an
approach for fear of emboldening separatist movements elsewhere.221
Although it is one of Kosovo’s harshest critics, Russia has surprisingly
embraced the ICJ’s advisory decision as precedent, invoking it to justify
its interventions in Georgia and Ukraine.222 In response to Western
211

Written Statement by the Russian Federation, supra note 195, at ¶ 94.
Id. ¶ 97.
213
See id. ¶ 99.
214
Id.
215
Id. ¶¶ 101, 103.
216
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59, 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat.
1031, U.N.T.S. 993, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 215 (1945).
217
Id. art. 65.
218
Advisory Jurisdiction, I.C.J., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?
p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
219
Id.
220
See Borgen, supra note 12.
221
See id.
222
See, e.g., Angelika Nußberger, Abkhazia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT’L L. ¶ 30 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online) (last updated Jan. 2013) [hereinafter,
Abkhazia Max Planck]; Burke-White, supra note 59, at 5; Waters, supra note 60; Russia
Max Planck, supra note 7, at ¶ 150. See infra Part V for a full discussion on Russia’s
212
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recognition of Kosovo, former President Dmitry Medvedev stated:
Western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo’s illegal
declaration of independence from Serbia. We argued
consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the
Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups
around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo
Albanians was not good for them. In international relations,
you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for
others.223
In his March 18, 2014 speech to the Russian Duma,224 President Putin
referenced the Kosovo Advisory Opinion in legally justifying Crimea’s
declaration of independence.225 In effect, Russia flipped the tables
against Western powers and used Kosovo as precedent to its own
advantage.
V. RUSSIA’S LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION IN
GEORGIA AND UKRAINE
Russia engaged in legal rhetoric to justify its actions to the
international community for intervening in Georgia and Ukraine.
Several potential reasons explain why Russia made such carefully
crafted legal arguments. Russia might have felt bound by international
law and, therefore, set forth arguments believed to accurately reflect
it. Additionally, Russia may have been worried about reputational
costs226 for disregarding international law completely and felt obligated
to proffer legal justifications. A “state with a poor reputation is either
excluded from deals or it is charged a high price of admission.”227
Regardless of the reasoning, it is necessary to identify Russia’s legal
arguments for intervention to draw the dichotomy between Russia’s
legal stance in the Security Council and how it behaves unilaterally.
Russia’s legal justifications are more than just legalese. The
examination of statements made by states is imperative in assessing
legal justifications for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine.
223
Christopher Waters, South Ossetia, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175, 179 (Christian Walters ed., 2014) [hereinafter, Christopher
Waters South Ossetia] (quoting Dmitry Medvedev, Why I Had to Recognize Georgia’s
Breakaway Regions, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/9c7ad792-7395-11dd-8a66-0000779fd18c.html#axzz1fDVC6nP8).
224
The Russian Duma is the lower house of the Russia’s national parliament,
known as the Federal Assembly.
225
See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 5–6.
226
Reputational costs are consequences of state behavior that negatively influence
state reputation.
227
Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 245
(2009).
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customary international law.228 Both opinio juris and state practice may
be derived from state legal rhetoric.229 The ICJ frequently considers
official statements as examples of state practice.230 Russia’s legal
rhetoric can be construed as evidence opinio juris and state practice,
thereby having potential to alter customary international law or, at the
very least, create new international norms if accompanied with
international acceptance.
Sub-part A discusses the Russian
intervention in Georgia and Russia’s subsequent legal justifications for
participating in the conflict. Sub-part B similarly analyzes the more
recent events in Ukraine. Both of these sub-parts will also consider
whether these legal arguments pass muster under the four UN legal
order components discussed supra. Finally, Sub-part C will describe
commonalities, if any, between the legal arguments that Russia has
proffered for each conflict.
A. Russia’s Unilateral Intervention in Georgia
1.

Revisiting the Five Day Russo-Georgian War

The origin of the war between Russia and Georgia lies in the
Soviet Union’s perestroika period. Georgia was a republic within the
Soviet Union that enjoyed significant administrative powers and state
apparatus.231
South Ossetia and Abkhazia232 were both semiautonomous regions within the republic.233 On September 20, 1990,
South Ossetia asserted its sovereignty as a republic within the Soviet
Union—Georgia subsequently withdrew South Ossetia’s limited
autonomy, sparking full-scale armed conflict.234 In a similar fashion,
Georgia annulled the Abkhaz declaration of state sovereignty in 1990,

228

In determining sources of international law, Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of
the ICJ defines customary international law as “a general practice accepted as law.”
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat. 1031,
U.N.T.S. 993, 39 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 215 (1945).
229
Assessment of Customary International Law, supra note 81; see supra note 81
(defining opinio juris and state practice).
230
See,
e.g.,
Case
concerning
the
Gab íkovo-Nagymaros
Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39–46 (Sept. 25); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 100 (June 27).
231
See South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note 72, at ¶ 6.
232
In 1931, Abkhazia was downgraded from its own republic within the Soviet
Union to an autonomous region within the Georgian republic creating tension
between Georgia and Abkhazia. See Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 8.
233
Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 8; South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note
72, at ¶ 5.
234
Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 176; South Ossetia Max Planck,
supra note 72, at ¶ 10.
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further flaring tensions.235 Georgia gained international recognition
by the end of 1991 due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Abkhazia
and South Ossetia both declared independence from Georgia in 1992,
but much of the world believed that the territories legally remained
within the new Georgian state.236
In the midst of these events, the armed conflict within Georgia
intensified. In regards to South Ossetia, the skirmishes lasted through
1992, resulting in approximately 60,000 displaced Ossetians and
Georgians.237 The armed conflict concluded with Georgia, Russia, and
South Ossetia signing the Sochi Agreement in 1992.238 The ceasefire
agreement deployed peacekeepers from each of the three signatories
into South Ossetia, and negotiations commenced, sponsored by the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
regarding the future status of South Ossetia.239
The events unfolded differently in Abkhazia. Georgians and
Abkhazians reportedly committed mass human rights violations
during this time period.240 The conflict resulted in the mass eviction of
Georgians from Abkhazia as a result of an effective ethnic cleansing
campaign.241 Unlike the situation in South Ossetia, the UN was
involved in Abkhazia. A ceasefire brokered by Russia and the UN was
signed in July 1993.242 Negotiations began to attempt to reconcile the
differences between Georgia and Abkhazia under the auspices of the
UN and the OSCE.243
Throughout the 1990s, Russia began offering South Ossetians and
Abkhazians Russian passports and citizenship.244 Additionally, South
Ossetians and Abkhazians enjoyed free travel into Russia with the
ability to earn Russian pensions and obtain other social benefits.245 The
235

Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
237
Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 176.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 177; Toomey, supra note 5, at 447.
240
Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 13.
241
Id.
242
Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 14; Farhad Mirzayev, Abkhazia, in SELFDETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191, 193 (Christian Walters ed.,
2014).
243
See supra note 242.
244
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, UP IN FLAMES: HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS AND
CIVILIAN VICTIMS IN THE CONFLICT OVER SOUTH OSSETIA 18 (Jan. 23, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/01/22/flames-0 (“[B]y the end of 2007,
according to the South Ossetian authorities, some 97 percent of residents of South
Ossetia had obtained Russian passports.”).
245
See id.
236

MASTROIANNI (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/1/2016 8:30 PM

COMMENT

631

popularly deemed “Rose Revolution” occurred in 2003, ousting the
Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze from the Georgian
presidency.246 Mikheil Saakashvili’s ascent to power flared tensions in
2004 when, under his direction, Georgia began an effort to reestablish
control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.247 Former President Mikheil
Saakashvili did not hesitate to warn that if peaceful efforts failed to reintegrate both regions, Georgia would resort to physical force.248
Despite such efforts, ninety-five percent of South Ossetians voted for
separation from Georgia in a 2006 referendum.249
During NATO’s April 2008 summit in Bucharest, officials
considered extending membership to Georgia and Ukraine.250 The
inclusion of these two states that directly border Russian territory
raised serious concern within Russia.251 Russia’s deputy foreign
minister at the time warned: “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in
the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious
consequences for pan-European security.”252
Tensions came to a head in early August 2008. The facts of how
the war began are hotly contested; however, the standard account is
that Georgia attacked the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, on
August 7, 2008.253 In response, the Russian military mobilized on
August 8, 2008, commencing a full-scale two-week military campaign
against Georgia.254 Not only did Russian troops seek to repel the
Georgian forces in Tskhinvali,255 but they also sought to attack

246

Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 177; see Giorgi Kandelaki,
Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective, U.S. INST. PEACE, July 2006, at 10,
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr167.pdf (noting that to the dismay of
Russia, Western powers and other Western non-governmental organizations
supported the Rose Revolution).
247
Supra note 246; Waters, supra note 60, at 191.
248
Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 178.
249
Toomey, supra note 5, at 449.
250
See Press Release, NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration (Apr. 3, 2008), at ¶ 23,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
251
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
252
Mearsheimer, supra note 7, at 79.
253
See Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 1, 10; see also Christopher Waters South
Ossetia, supra note 223, at 178. On the contrary, Georgia contests this account for two
reasons. First, Georgia claims that it attacked Tskhinvali in response to numerous
South Ossetian attacks upon Georgian villages. See Borgen, supra note 12, at 5; Waters,
supra note 60, at 207. Second, Georgia maintains that Russian troops traveled from
North Ossetia on August 7th and went through the Roki tunnel. Therefore, the attack
aimed to prevent Russian troops from entering South Ossetia from the Roki tunnel.
See Toomey, supra note 5, at 450–51; Waters, supra note 60, at 207.
254
Borgen, supra note 12, at 5.
255
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 244, at 22–23; Toomey, supra note 5, at 451.
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undisputed Georgian territory.256 In fact, Russian forces came within
miles of the Georgian capital, Tbilsi.257
Although the 2008 war was triggered by events in South Ossetia,
conflict erupted in Abkhazia as well. Russian and Abkhazian troops
attacked Georgian forces stationed in the upper Kodori Valley, a
region with no association to the Abkhazian plight.258 Abkhazian forces
seized the territory after expelling the local Georgian population.259
On August 12, 2008, French President Nikolas Sarkozy brokered
the Six Point Ceasefire Agreement between the parties.260 Shortly
thereafter, Russian troops withdrew from Georgia proper and
returned to their South Ossetian bases.261 Russia formally recognized
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states on August 26, 2008.262
As of this Comment, a total of four UN member states officially
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states: Russia,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru.263
2.

Russia’s Legal Arguments Justifying Intervention

Russia’s military operations in Georgia effectively ousted the
Georgian government from power in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a
clear violation of the prohibition against the use of force and the norm
of non-intervention. Russia asserted three main legal arguments to
justify its unilateral intervention in Georgia. It is evident that Russia
took care in crafting its legal position to facially comport with the UN
legal order’s principles. For example, Russia is well aware that there
are only a few exceptions264 to the prohibition on the use of force and
invoked those exceptions as legal justifications for its military

256

Borgen, supra note 12, at 15–16.
Id. at 5.
258
Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 18.
259
Id.
260
OFFICE OF THE STATE MINISTER OF GEORGIA FOR RECONCILIATION AND CIVIC
EQUALITY, SIX POINT PEACE PLAN (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.smr.gov.ge/
docs/doc111.pdf.
261
Borgen, supra note 12, at 5.
262
Id. at 5–6.
263
Abkhazia Max Planck, supra note 222, at ¶ 20; South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note
72, at ¶ 1. The island nation of Tuvalu withdrew its recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in 2014.
Tuvalu Profile–Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16340166.
Vanuatu
withdrew
recognition from Abkhazia in 2011. See SB, Vanuatu Withdraws Recognition of Abkhazia,
EURASIAN L. BREAKING NEWS (June 20, 2011), http://eurasian-law-breakingnews.blogspot.com/2011_06_01_archive.html.
264
These exceptions include self-defense and humanitarian intervention. See U.N.
Charter arts. 42, 51; Green, supra note 31, at 229.
257
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intervention in Georgia and Ukraine. The real question, however, is
whether Russia’s legal justifications actually comport with the UN legal
order or whether they only conform on a surface level.
The first sub-part of this Section will address the Russian
“privileged interests” doctrine, from which two of Russia’s legal
arguments derive. Next, the second sub-part will explain Russia’s
argument that it acted in self-defense for ethnic Russians in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The third sub-part discusses the humanitarianbased concerns, which Russia asserted warranted intervention. Finally,
the fourth sub-part will address Russia’s final legal justification for
intervention, predicated upon defending Russian peacekeepers within
Georgia pursuant to the Sochi Agreement.265
i.The Privileged Interests Doctrine
Before analyzing the first two justifications indicated supra, it is
necessary to discuss the privileged interests doctrine. Russia first
coined the term “privileged interests” in 1968 when it advanced the
Brezhnev doctrine to justify military aid to “fraternal count[ries]”
dealing with civil strife.266 More recently, in 2008 the Russian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, explained that the doctrine means
remembering “relationships with our old friends.”267 In essence, the
privileged interests doctrine resembles the old “sphere of influence”
rhetoric used during the Cold War. Mr. Lavrov defined the doctrine
to mean Russia “will develop friendly, mutually beneficial relations
with all those who are prepared to do the same on the equal and
mutually beneficial basis, paying particular attention to the traditional
partners of the Russian Federation.”268 Mr. Lavrov further indicated
that these “traditional partners” include the states of the former Soviet
Union.269 During a speech on September 12, 2008 (only days after
Russia withdrew from much of Georgia), then-President Medvedev
asserted that Russia would foster close relations with states with which
it has traditionally been close.270 Significantly, both Georgia and
265

See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text.
See Toomey, supra note 5.
267
Id. at 444 (quoting Transcript of Response to Questions by Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, During the Meeting with the Members of the Council
on Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, New York
(Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/world/sergey-lavrov/p34440 [hereinafter,
Lavrov Transcript]).
268
Lavrov Transcript, supra note 267.
269
Id.
270
Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, Meeting with the
Participants
in
the
International
Club
Valdai
(Sept.
12,
2008),
266
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Ukraine were previously republics within the Soviet Union and,
therefore, fit within the privileged interests doctrine.
Article 61 of the Russian Constitution states: “[t]he Russian
Federation shall guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage
abroad.”271 Pursuant to this article and the privileged interests
doctrine, Russia argues that it legally has the right to exercise some
control over states that host Russian citizens.272 Significantly, Russia
also believes that it may legally intervene on behalf of ethnic Russians
in danger abroad under the auspices of humanitarian rescue.273
Therefore, if an ethnic Russian finds himself or herself in imminent
danger, Russia may unilaterally intervene to rescue the individual so
long as the force used is proportionate.274
As will be discussed in more detail infra, Russia specifically views
the right of self-defense to include the protection of its nationals
abroad.275 For example, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation, Valery Zorkin, interpreted Article 61 of the
Russian Constitution to permit Russia “to apply the full force of its
military and destroy the armed forces of a foreign state if the goal of
such an operation is to secure the lives of its compatriots who are
permanently living abroad.”276 Therefore, the privileged interests
doctrine applies to several components of the UN legal order discussed
For example, the doctrine broadens the scope of
supra.277
humanitarian rescue and humanitarian intervention to ethnic
Russians in foreign states, especially if those states are “traditional
partners” with Russia. Moreover, the privileged interests doctrine
provides Russia with legal justification for a military invasion of another
state that threatens the security of Russian nationals. The scope of the
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/12/1644_type82912type82917ty
pe84779_206409.shtml.
271
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 61, ¶ 2
(Russ.).
272
See Lavrov Transcript, supra note 267.
273
Toomey, supra note 5, at 474 (citing Andrew E. Kramer & James Kanter, Gas
Dispute Runs Deeper Than Pipes, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/world/europe/14gazprom.html?_r=0);
Christian Walter, Postscript: Self-Determination, Secession, and the Crimean Crisis 2014, in
SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293, 307 (2014)
[hereinafter, Walter Crimea]; see also supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
274
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
275
Burke-White, supra note 59, at 5.
276
Peter Roudik, Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php (last updated Dec.
15, 2014). See Valery Zorkin, [Peace Enforcement and Human Rights], ROSSIYSKAYA
GAZETA (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.rg.ru/2008/08/13/zorkin.html.
277
See supra Part II.

MASTROIANNI (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/1/2016 8:30 PM

COMMENT

635

doctrine becomes very important in explaining Russia’s legal
justifications for unilateral intervention in both Georgia and Ukraine.
ii.Self-Defense of Ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia
As indicated supra, many ethnic Russians and Russian nationals
resided in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is largely due to Russia
conferring citizenship and providing passports to many South
Ossetians and Abkhazians during the 1990s.278 In accordance with the
privileged interests doctrine, Russia asserted its legal right to intervene
on behalf of the ethnic Russians residing in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.279 On August 8, 2008, Russia called an emergency meeting
of the Security Council to discuss the situation and called for the
Security Council to condemn the Georgian attacks.280 Mr. Churkin
explained that “[m]assive artillery fire [was] being directed against a
peaceful civilian population, including old people and children, using
Grad multiple launch systems and large-calibre rocket launchers.”281
Russia characterized Georgia’s August 7, 2008 attacks upon the
“peaceful population of South Ossetia” as “treacherous” and
“criminal.”282 Moreover, Russia claimed that Georgia had similar plans
to attack Abkhazia.283 Therefore, Russia asserted the right to selfdefense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter to protect ethnic
Russians.284 Russia claims that it continued to use force in self-defense
until the conditions warranted otherwise.285 Additionally, Russia
asserted a humanitarian rescue claim to justify the unilateral
intervention on behalf of South Ossetian and Abkhazian civilians.286
It is undeniable that Russia breached Georgia’s territorial
integrity and the norm of non-intervention through its military
invasion into parts of Georgia.287 Russia attempted to justify its conduct
278

See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
280
See U.N. SCOR, 63th Sess., 5951th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5951 (Aug. 8, 2008).
281
See id. at 2.
282
See Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 188–89 (discussing Russia’s written
submission to the fact-finding mission detailing Russia’s factual and legal views upon
the war with Georgia).
283
Id. at 190.
284
Id. at 188; Borgen, supra note 12, at 16; Lee, supra note 41, at 291; Toomey, supra
note 5, at 444, 465.
285
See Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 189.
286
Lee, supra note 41, at 254, 257. As detailed supra, humanitarian rescue is a
subset of the general right of self-defense. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying
text.
287
See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 205.
279
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by invoking the right to self-defense and humanitarian rescue, a subset
doctrine under the right to self-defense, as lawful exceptions to
territorial integrity and the norm of non-intervention.288 The problem,
however, is that both of these arguments do not pass muster.
Russia’s actions do not meet the requirements to assert selfdefense under Article 51 of the UN Charter289 for three main reasons:
(1) no armed attack290 occurred on Russian territory; (2) the right to
self-defense did not extend to ethnic Russians in Georgia; and (3)
Russia acted disproportionately. First, to warrant overriding the
general prohibition on the use of force, the victim state may only use
force “to protect the security of a State and its essential rights, in
particular the rights of territorial integrity and political
independence.”291 Therefore, the armed attack must rise to a certain
level of severity for a state to resort to unilateral military action. An
attack that was not launched upon or against the victim state’s territory
will most likely not suffice because no nexus exists between the attack
and the state’s territory.292 Since Georgia’s attacks upon ethnic
Russians were conducted within Georgian territory, and therefore did
not directly threaten the security of the Russian state, Russia may not
have asserted the right to self-defense.
Moreover, the danger ethnic Russians faced at the hands of the
Georgian government could not trigger Russia’s right to self-defense.293
As described supra, many South Ossetians and Abkhazians received
Russian citizenship and passports.294 The conferral of Russian
citizenship, however, cannot justify Russia’s military intervention based
upon self-defense.295 The European Union’s (EU) Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia affirmed
this by stating:
288

See supra Part II for a discussion about the right of self-defense and
humanitarian rescue.
289
See also supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
290
See supra note 45 and accompanying text for the ICJ’s interpretation of what
constitutes as an armed attack.
291
STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1996). See also G. Nolte & A. Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY vol. II, ¶ 28 (B. Simma et al. eds.,
2012).
292
See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 206; see also A. Randelzhofer & O. Dörr, Article
2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY vol. I, ¶ 58 (B. Simma et
al. eds., 2012).
293
See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 206 (“[I]nternational law does not allow the use
of force against other states for the protection of one’s own citizens.”).
294
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
295
See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 208.
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The mass conferral of Russian citizenship to Georgian
nationals and the provision of passports on a massive scale
on Georgian territory, including its breakaway provinces,
without the consent of the Georgian Government runs
against the principles of good neighborliness and constitutes
an open challenge to Georgian sovereignty and an
interference in the internal affairs of Georgia.296
Thus, even if the right to self-defense applied to attacks conducted
outside of the victim state, attacks upon ethnic Russians in Georgia did
not give Russia the right to defend itself.
Finally, Russia’s claim for self-defense fails because Russia acted
with a disproportionate amount of force.297 Factors to consider in the
proportionality analysis include the types of weapons used, the
duration of the defensive military action, the scope of the operation,
and the amount of territory covered.298 The defensive military action
must be “limited and temporary unilateral intervention, [used] only as
a last resort.”299 Russia not only engaged in a full-scale military invasion
of not only South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also extended its military
operations to undisputed Georgian territory.300 Overall, the argument
that Russia could legally defend ethnic Russians within Georgia does
not comport with the UN legal order, especially because the failure to
meet any of the three aforementioned deficiencies quashes Russia’s
self-defense claim.
Unlike the discussion regarding self-defense supra, humanitarian
rescue may be lawfully asserted to protect nationals abroad who face
imminent death.301 Therefore, an armed attack upon Russian territory
is not required for Russia to assert that it legally intervened on behalf
of ethnic Russians abroad in Georgia. Although Russia’s argument for
intervention fares better under the humanitarian rescue doctrine, the
argument still fails for two main reasons: (1) Russia acted
disproportionately; and (2) the ethnic Russians in Georgia were not
legally Russian nationals.
For the same aforementioned reasons that Russia acted
disproportionately for purposes of asserting a lawful self-defense claim,
296

Id. (citing Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 18).
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 244, at 93–119; Tagliavini Report, supra note
65, at 21.
298
Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 27.
299
Nanda, supra note 46.
300
See Borgen, supra note 12, at 5; Toomey, supra note 5, at 476. But see Waters,
supra note 60, at 219–20 (arguing that Russia acted proportionately because it did not
invade enough of Georgia proper to delegitimize the defensive action).
301
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
297
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Russia also acted disproportionately for purposes of asserting a
humanitarian rescue claim.302 Additionally, the provision of citizenship
and passports to ethnic Russians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is
dubious at best under international law.
Specifically, the
“passportized” Abkhazians and South Ossetians did not qualify as
Russian citizens for the purposes of the humanitarian rescue
doctrine.303 Indeed, the ICJ in the Nottebohm Case noted that the act of
naturalizing a person with little connection to the naturalizing state
should not be recognized by another state since it disregards the
concept of nationality in international relations.304
Because
humanitarian rescue only applies to the defending state’s citizens, the
circumstances in Georgia did not warrant humanitarian rescue.
iii. Humanitarian Intervention in Georgia
In addition, Russia also asserted that it had a legal right to
intervene in Georgia based upon humanitarian concerns and R2P.305
Mr. Lavrov explained that pursuant to the privileged interests
doctrine, Russia could intervene based upon humanitarian concerns
and that Russia would protect its people “wherever they are” and “with
all means available.”306 Russia realizes that after the Soviet Union’s
collapse, many ethnic Russians found themselves in the minority in the
newly created states, like Georgia.307 In accordance with this
realization, Mr. Lavrov wrote:
We can’t understand why those who are talking about the
responsibility to protect and about the security of the person
at every turn, forgot it when it came to the part of the former
Soviet space where authorities began to kill innocent people,
appealing to sovereignty and territorial integrity. For us, the
issue in South Ossetia was to protect our citizens directly on

302

Indeed, the proportionality requirement seems to be stricter for humanitarian
rescue operations. For example, the 1976 Israeli raid in Entebbe, Uganda entailed
approximately 200 Israeli troops raiding an airport in Entebbe to rescue 100 hostages
held by pro-Palestinian hijackers. The mission lasted thirty-five minutes, killing twenty
Ugandan soldiers and three hostages in the cross-fire. See 1976: Israelis Rescue Entebbe
Hostages, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/
newsid_2786000/2786967.stm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). Therefore, humanitarian
rescue typically entails small-scale military operations intended only to remove the
state’s nationals from danger.
303
Toomey, supra note 5, at 476.
304
See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, ¶¶ 59, 67 (Apr. 6).
305
See Borgen, supra note 12, at 16; Lee, supra note 41, at 291; Toomey, supra note
5, at 444, 465.
306
See Lavrov Transcript, supra note 267.
307
Borgen, supra note 12, at 19.
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the borders of Russia, not in the Falkland Islands.308
Thus, Russia did not assert that it had a broad legal right to intervene
anywhere in the world based upon humanitarian concerns and R2P,
but only within the post-Soviet states. Specifically relating to Georgia,
Russia argued that the previously aforementioned Georgian attacks on
civilians, which began on August 7, 2008, amounted to ethnic
cleansing of South Ossetians.309 Additionally, on August 10, 2008, thenPresident Medvedev accused Georgia of committing genocide in South
Ossetia, and Russia’s Prosecutor’s Office began documenting the
alleged war crimes for future prosecution.310
Russia’s claim that it legally intervened in Georgia based upon
humanitarian concerns and/or R2P hinges upon the same factual
finding that South Ossetians and Abkhazians faced an extreme amount
of peril at the hands of the Georgian state right before Russia
intervened.311 Georgia clearly endangered the lives of its citizens
during the August 7, 2008 attack in South Ossetia. As discussed supra,
Russia argued that Georgia committed ethnic cleansing in South
Ossetia.312 The EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission
on the Conflict in Georgia, however, found that genocide did not take
place despite Russia’s insistence.313 Russia compared the Georgian
conflict to Kosovo; however, the Kosovo conflict resulted in large-scale
ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars314 while the situation in Georgia was
politically rooted, without systemic discrimination against the South
Ossetians or Abkhazians for their ethnic Russian heritage.315
Therefore, whether the danger to South Ossetians after Georgia’s
August 7, 2008 attack warranted R2P or humanitarian intervention is
ambiguous at best.
308

Id. at 20 (citing Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov’s Article ‘Russian
Foreign Policy and a New Quality of the Geopolitical Situation’ for Diplomatic Yearbook 2008,
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b4325699
9005bcbb3/bc2150e49dad6a04c325752e0036e93f?OpenDocument (last visited Dec.
23, 2015)).
309
See Lee, supra note 41, at 291. Russia reformulated its perspective on territorial
sovereignty as based upon the will of the people shown by factual circumstances on
the ground. See Borgen, supra note 12, at 20. In accordance with this perspective,
Russia argued it was not overlooking Georgia’s territorial integrity, but the
circumstances in South Ossetia made it very unlikely for South Ossetians to remain
within Georgia’s sovereign territory. Id. at 20–21.
310
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 244, at 70. This same report, however, ultimately
determined that Georgia was not guilty of genocide. Id. at 71.
311
See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
312
See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
313
Christopher Waters South Ossetia, supra note 223, at 187.
314
See Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 196.
315
See id.
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Russia does not have a legal claim for humanitarian intervention
for one main reason: Russia did not receive Security Council
authorization to intervene in Georgia.316 Moreover, R2P has not yet
formed into customary international law.317 Due to R2P’s ambiguous
status within the UN legal order, it would be very unlikely for a singular
state to successfully rely upon R2P to justify intervention. Indeed, R2P
originally became a part of the UN legal order after having been
invoked to justify multilateral interventions.318 Even if R2P could be
seen as a legitimate justification for unilateral intervention, only mass
atrocities committed against the civilian population may trigger a right
for foreign intervention.319 The aforementioned circumstances in
Georgia did not rise to this high threshold.320 Overall, Russia’s
humanitarian-based arguments do not carry much legal weight.
iv.Self-Defense of Russian Peacekeepers
Finally, Russia argued that it had a legal right to defend the
Russian peacekeepers stationed in Georgia pursuant to the Sochi
Agreement.321 During the August 7, 2008 Georgian attack, eighteen
Russian peacekeeping troops were killed.322 The attack was classified
as “an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers.”323 Thus, in
addition to asserting a claim of self-defense for ethnic Russians, Russia
also asserted self-defense of its peacekeepers as a legal reason for its
unilateral intervention in Georgia.
This is Russia’s strongest legal argument to justify its unilateral
intervention in Georgia. Although Russia characterizes its legal
argument in terms of the general right of self-defense, for reasons
discussed supra regarding the requirement for an armed attack on the
defending state’s territory, it is more accurate to categorize Russia’s
legal argument under the doctrine of humanitarian rescue, a subset of

316

See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
318
See supra Part III stating, however, that Security Council R2P invocation is also
unlikely to occur because of the veto power held by Russia and China.
319
See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT 31 (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
320
Mirzayev, supra note 242, at 195–96 (“These minority groups were not subject
to acts of genocide or gross violation of human rights.”).
321
See South Ossetia Max Planck, supra note 72, at ¶ 29; see also Russia Max Planck,
supra note 7, at ¶ 30; Waters, supra note 60, at 211.
322
Waters, supra note 60, at 206.
323
Id. at 195 (quoting Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russ., Statement on the
Situation in South Ossetia (Aug. 8, 2008), http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/
2008/08/08/1553_type82912type82913_205032.shtml).
317
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the right to self-defense.324 Indeed, a state may take unilateral action
to defend its citizens in danger abroad.325 The Russian peacekeepers,
who were lawfully present in Georgia pursuant to the Sochi
Agreement, were Russian citizens. Moreover, it became apparent that
Russian peacekeepers faced imminent danger after the August 7, 2008
attack orchestrated by the Georgian government that killed eighteen
peacekeepers.326 The EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia found that Russia intervened
lawfully on behalf of its peacekeepers stationed in South Ossetia.327
Humanitarian rescue justified Russia’s immediate reaction to
defend Russian peacekeepers after the August 7, 2008 attack, but it did
not justify the invasion of Georgia that spilled into Georgia proper.328
Indeed, the EU’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on
the Conflict in Georgia stated:
The Russian reaction to the Georgian attack can be divided
into two phases: first, the immediate reaction in order to
defend Russian peacekeepers, and second, the invasion of
Georgia by Russian armed forces reaching far beyond the
administrative boundary of South Ossetia. In the first
instance, there seems to be little doubt that if the Russian
peacekeepers were attacked, Russia had the right to defend
them using military means proportionate to the attack.
Hence the Russian use of force for defensive purposes during
the first phase of the conflict would be legal. On the second
item, it must be ascertained whether the subsequent Russian
military campaign deeper into Georgia was necessary and
proportionate in terms of defensive action against the initial
Georgian attack. Although it should be admitted that it is
not easy to decide where the line must be drawn, it seems,
however, that much of the Russian military action went far
beyond the reasonable limits of defense.329
Therefore, humanitarian rescue of Russian peacekeepers was a
legitimate justification for the August 8, 2008 intervention, but not for
Russia’s subsequent full-scale military invasion.

324

See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
326
See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
327
Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 23; see also Russia Max Planck, supra note 7,
at ¶ 30.
328
Tagliavini Report, supra note 65, at 23.
329
Id. at 23–24.
325
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B. Russia’s Unilateral Intervention in Ukraine
1.

The Crimean Crisis

The fundamental source of the Crimean crisis lies in its unique
history and relationships with the West and Russia. Crimea is the only
Russian-majority province in Ukraine.330 According to census data
from 2001, 58.5% of Crimea’s population is ethnic Russian, 24.4% is
Ukrainian, and 12.1% is Crimean Tartars.331 There is a general divide
within Ukraine: western and central Ukraine largely align with Western
powers while support for Russia is preeminent in southern and eastern
Ukraine.332 This east-west divide is based upon cultural differences,
emotional sentiment, and politics.333
In 1954, Crimea was “gifted” from the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic to the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic because
then-General Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev,
had strong ties to Ukraine.334 When the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991, Ukraine gained independence due to its republic status. It was
not until 1992 that post-Soviet nationalists began contesting the legality
of Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine.335 In fact, on May 21, 1992, the Russian
Duma declared the transfer illegal.336 Only several days prior to this
declaration, Crimea’s legislature passed an independence resolution
and scheduled a subsequent referendum for Crimeans to decide the
peninsula’s future status.337 As a result of these events, Ukraine allowed
for Crimea to become an autonomous republic with significant
authority to self-rule within Ukraine.338 Subsequently, in 1997, under
the direction of then-President Leonid Kuchma, Russia and Ukraine
330

RAJAN MENON & EUGENE RUMER, CONFLICT IN UKRAINE: THE UNWINDING OF THE
POST-COLD WAR ORDER 2 (2015).
331
Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 295.
332
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330.
333
See id.; Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis–An International Law Perspective, 74
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 367 (2014), http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/Marxsen_2014__The_crimea_crisis_-_an_international_law_perspective.pdf.
334
See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 296; see also Krishnadev Calamur, Crimea: A
Gift to Ukraine Becomes a Political Flash Point, N.P.R (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-toukraine-becomes-a-political-flash-point (theorizing that Crimea was “gifted” to
Ukraine because the transfer marked the 300th-year anniversary of Ukraine’s
integration into the Russian empire).
335
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 3.
336
Id.
337
Id. at 3–4 (citing Serge Schmemann, Crimean Parliament Votes to Back Independence
from Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/
world/crimea-parliament-votes-to-back-independence-from-ukraine.html).
338
Id. at 4; Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 296.
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executed the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and
Partnership with Russia acknowledging Ukraine’s international
borders, including Crimea.339 In that same year, the two states
executed an agreement that allowed Russia to lease a naval base in
Sevastopol (a port city within Crimea) for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.340
Although President Kuchma emphasized strengthening ties with
Russia in his presidential campaign, he also developed relationships
with the EU and NATO. For example, in 1997, Ukraine and NATO
signed a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.341 In 2002, President
Kuchma signed an Action Plan declaring Ukraine’s “long-term goal of
NATO membership.”342 Moreover, this sentiment was reaffirmed in
Ukraine’s military policy that further added Ukraine’s commitment to
becoming a full-fledged member of the EU.343 It was only after the EU
and NATO made it clear that the organizations did not plan to confer
membership upon Ukraine anytime soon that President Kuchma
turned his focus back to fostering ties with Russia. Specifically, he
announced that Ukraine was not ready to become a NATO member
and deleted any reference to NATO membership within the military
doctrine.344
The 2004 presidential election within Ukraine illuminated the
east-west divide within the state. The two front-runners were Viktor
Yushchenko, an ethnic Ukrainian who was seen by Russia as an
advocate for Western integration, and Viktor Yanukovych, an ethnic
Russian from the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine bordering with
Russia.345 Yanukovych initially won the election; however, alleged
election fraud spurred widespread political protests that involved the
protester occupation of Kiev’s Independence Square.346 These
protests, which became known as the Orange Revolution, resulted in a
new election that Yushchenko won with 51.2% of the votes.347 This was
a strong blow to the pro-Russian region of Ukraine that created
internal unrest.348
339

Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 296.
See Eric Posner, The 1997 Black Sea Fleet Agreement Between Russia and Ukraine,
ERIC POSNER BLOG (Mar. 5, 2014), http://ericposner.com/.
341
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 28.
342
See NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, NATO (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19547.htm?.
343
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 28.
344
Id. at 29.
345
See id. at 34.
346
See id.
347
Id.
348
Id. (discussing how some protesters called for merging eastern Ukraine with
340
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Much like the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia,349 Western states
and Western non-governmental organizations supported the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine.350 This did not sit well with Yanukovych and his
supporters, who rallied against the foreign interference.351 Western
support displeased Russia as well, especially because it followed a
similar pattern to the Rose Revolution in Georgia only one year
earlier.352
It became clear that President Yushchenko was no Russian ally for
several reasons. First, President Yushchenko made integration with the
EU and NATO a priority.353 Second, he condemned Russia’s unilateral
Yushchenko even offered to send
intervention in Georgia.354
Ukrainian troops to a proposed UN peacekeeping force within
Georgia.355 By the beginning of 2010, however, Yuschenko lost his
appeal to the Ukrainian people, causing the pendulum to swing back
in eastern Ukraine’s favor.
In his second presidential election in 2010, Yanukovych won by
relying upon Russophone Ukraine for support.356 Yanukovych’s
presidency soon became associated with corruption.357 The pervasive
corruption in Ukrainian politics largely caused Yanukovych to turn
away from signing the Associated Agreement with the EU, despite the
fact that integration would have greatly boosted Ukraine’s suffering
economy.358 President Yanukovych’s abrupt order to suspend talks with
the EU and NATO on November 21, 2013 came as a surprise to
everyone.359 In the same abrupt fashion, Yanukovych declared he
would resume negotiations with Russia to join the Eurasian Customs
Union (CU).360 Following through with EU membership would have
cut off Yanukovych from Russian support, effectively crippling his

Russia).
349
See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
350
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 35.
351
Id.
352
See id.
353
Id. at 39.
354
Id.
355
See Viktor Yushchenko, Georgia and the Stakes for Ukraine, WASH. POST (Aug. 25,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/24/
AR2008082401856.html.
356
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 44.
357
See id. at 47.
358
See id. at 51.
359
Id. at 77.
360
Id. At that time, the Eurasian Customs Union was comprised of Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan.
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power and finances.361 Unfortunately for him, this decision provoked
large-scale unrest in Western Ukraine, which ultimately led to his fall
from power.
Many EU officials and Ukrainians were angered with President
Yanukovych’s sudden withdrawal from negotiations, which led to
widespread civilian protests throughout Ukraine.362 By December
2013, protests included more than 800,000 civilians and were
escalating in violence, spurring protestors to seize Kyiv’s city hall.363 On
December 10, 2013, Ukrainian police violently attempted to dismantle
the protesters’ stronghold of Kyiv’s Independence Square, which
resulted in many civilian casualties that spurred condemnation from
the international community.364 The violence continued into February
2014, which influenced the Ukrainian government to sign a
compromise agreement that provided constitutional reform
beginning in September 2014 followed by a new presidential
election.365 Shortly thereafter, President Yanukovych fled from
Ukraine and sought refuge in Russia, causing the Ukrainian
Parliament to remove him from office on February 25, 2014.366 The
pro-Western protesters seemed to have won the battle by ousting the
pro-Russian regime.
In response to these events, pro-Russian demonstrations began on
February 23, 2014 in Crimea.367 Several days later, armed pro-Russian
protesters seized government buildings in Simferopol, the Crimean
capital.368 Subsequently, unidentified uniformed troops appeared
throughout Crimea.369 In the midst of widespread civil unrest between
the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian protesters, on March 1,
2014, the Russian Duma authorized President Vladimir Putin to deploy
Russian troops until conditions in Ukraine normalized.370 As a result
361
362

See id. at 51.
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 78; see also Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at

297.
363

MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 79.
Id.
365
Id. at 80; Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine - Full Text, GUARDIAN (Feb.
21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-thesettlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text.
366
MENON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 81.
367
Id. at 83.
368
See
Ukraine
Crisis:
Timeline,
BBC
NEWS
(Nov.
13,
2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
369
See id. Although wholly denied by Russia, reports rumor that Russian military
intervention began before the referendum occurred. See Walter Crimea, supra note 273,
at 302.
370
Russian Parliament Approves Troop Deployment in Ukraine, BBC NEWS (Mar. 1,
364
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of Russian-supported propaganda classifying the revolution in Ukraine
as a “Western plot executed by radical Ukrainian nationalists and
fascist elements,” the majority of Crimeans supported integration with
Russia.371 On March 16, 2014, an overwhelming amount of voters
decided to secede from Crimea and reunify with Russia.372 President
Putin executed a treaty with Crimean officials only two days after
annexing Crimea and effectively dismembering Ukrainian territory.373
Following Crimea’s swift annexation, Russia amassed troops on
the Ukrainian border, threatening military intervention.374 Moreover,
Russia supplied pro-Russian Ukrainians with weapons and other types
of logistical support.375 Self-proclaimed republics have been set up in
other parts of eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk and Luhansk,
continuing the violence between the Ukrainian government and proRussian forces.376 In the summer of 2014, Russia sent military supplies
and personnel to the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk in an effort
to maintain the Russian strongholds.377 It was not until September
2014 that the Ukrainian government signed a ceasefire agreement that
has resulted in a stalemate.378 By February 2015, more than 5400
people died since the crisis began.379
2.

Russia’s Legal Justifications for Unilateral Intervention

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine ultimately led to its annexation
of Crimea, effectively dismembering Ukraine’s territory.380 The
privileged interests doctrine discussed supra is similarly relevant in

2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035.
371
MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 84.
372
Anna Stepanowa, International Law and the Legality of Secession in Crimea,
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L COMP. L. ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2014), http://cjicl.org.uk/
2014/04/20/international-law-legality-secession-crimea/. While the referendum was
held, Russian troops and paramilitary forces were visibly patrolling the streets.
MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at x.
373
See Will Englund, Kremlin Says Crimea is Now Officially Part of Russia After Treaty
Signing, Putin Speech, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-crimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html.
374
MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 85.
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
Id. at 86.
378
Id.
379
Ukraine Conflict: Death Toll Rises Ahead of Peace Talks, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31392473.
380
Although the current status of Crimea is controversial, Russia retains de facto
control of the territory.
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analyzing Russia’s justifications for intervention in Ukraine.381 Russia
proffered three primary legal arguments to legitimize the events in
Ukraine. This Section will consider whether these justifications pass
muster under the UN legal order.
Before analyzing Russia’s legal arguments set forth to legitimize
its intervention in Ukraine, it is necessary to differentiate the conflict
from the Russo-Georgian War. Unlike in Georgia, Russia did not
execute a full-scale military invasion into Ukraine, but Russia did
acquire new territory. In order for the annexation of Crimea to be
lawful under international law, a specific series of events needed to
occur. First, Crimea needed to secede382 from Ukraine so that Russia
would not violate Ukraine’s territorial integrity by acquiring territory
through the use of force.383 Second, the newly independent Crimea
would have had to freely consent to incorporation with Russia without
any duress.384 If Crimea never became independent from Ukraine,
Russia’s subsequent action of annexing the territory, and the means it
took to acquire the territory, were illegal. This same two-stage process
was set forth by President Putin in his March 18, 2014 address to
incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation.385 Therefore, Russia
not only set forth justifications for intervention, it also asserted legal
arguments to legitimize Crimea’s secession from Ukraine.
Whether Russia actually used physical force in Crimea is highly
disputed. Russia wholly denies that Russian military forces entered
Crimea (besides the forces already lawfully stationed in Sevastopol386)
before Crimea’s purportedly lawful secession.387 Nonetheless, some
reports indicated the opposite, stating that Russian military personnel
were already in Crimea before the secession referendum occurred.388
381

See supra notes 266–77 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
383
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39 (“The territory of a State shall not
be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force.
No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized
as legal.”).
384
See id.
385
Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.
386
During the Crimean conflict, Russia admitted to increasing the number of
armed forces in Sevastopol, but allegedly did not violate the 25,000-troop maximum
set by the Black Sea Fleet Agreement. Id.
387
See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
388
See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 302; see also Fredrik Dahl, OSCE Team Say
Crimea Roadblock Gunmen Threatened to Shoot at Them, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-crisis-osceidUSBREA2B1C120140312; Steven Erlanger, Ukrainian Government Rushes to Dampen
Secessionist Sentiment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/03/03/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0.
382
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If these reports are true, Russia violated the prohibition on the use of
force codified by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and must successfully
assert an exception to this rule (like self-defense) to legally justify the
intervention.389
Regardless, the threat of the use of force is prohibited under
Article 2(4), and member states may not intervene in the domestic
affairs of other states.390 On March 1, 2014, the Russian Duma
authorized President Putin to deploy Russian military units to Crimea
to stabilize the unrest within the peninsula.391 The authorization
represented a clear threat of force despite the fact that Russia never
mounted a full-scale military invasion.392 Moreover, Russia violated the
principle of non-intervention because the “prohibition of intervention
also applies to premature forms of recognition of secessionist
movements in terms of separate statehood.”393 Specifically, Russia’s
conduct provided material support for Crimea’s secession through the
March 1st authorization to use force and the political support given to
the Crimean separatists. After Crimea’s purported annexation, Russia
continued to violate the norm of non-intervention. In Nicaragua v.
United States, the ICJ held that the United States breached the norm of
non-intervention by supplying the Nicaraguan rebel forces with arms
and logistical support.394 Thus, Russia’s provision of weapons and
logistical support to pro-Russian forces within Ukraine similarly
violated the norm of non-intervention.395 The legal position adopted
by Russia to justify its actions in Crimea also seeks to assert exceptions
to the norm of non-intervention.
The first sub-part of this Section will discuss Russia’s claim that it
intervened on behalf of ethnic Russians in Crimea. In addition, the
second sub-part explains Russia’s assertion that it received consent
389

See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7; U.N. Charter art. 51.
391
See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
392
See Putin’s Speech, supra note 8 (“True, the President of the Russian Federation
received permission from the Upper House of Parliament to use the Armed Forces in
Ukraine. However, strictly speaking, nobody has acted on this permission yet.”).
Unlike the situation in Kosovo, where almost an entire decade elapsed between the
violence in 1999 and the 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, in Crimea,
only several days expired between the March 1, 2014 threat of the use of force and the
annexation agreement on March 18, 2014. Therefore, Crimea’s change in status was
much more directly connected to Russia’s conduct.
393
Stefan Oeter, The Role of Recognition and Non-Recognition with Regard to Secession,
in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 44, 51 (Christian Walter ed., 2014).
394
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 116–17, ¶ 247 (June 27).
395
MENNON & RUMER, supra note 330, at 85.
390
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from the Ukrainian government. Finally, the third sub-part will
address Russia’s invocation of self-determination to support its
intervention in Crimea.
i.Self-Defense of Ethnic Russians in Crimea
Similar to Russia’s legal position in Georgia, Russia argues that it
acted in lawful self-dense of ethnic Russians located within Crimea.396
In the context of the Russian Duma’s authorization of the use of force
in Crimea, the Duma Chairperson, Valentina Matviyenko, asserted that
there was “a real threat to the life and security of Russian citizens living
in Ukraine.”397 Additionally, the Chairperson stressed the significance
of taking “all possible measures, to ensure the security of our citizens
living in Ukraine.”398 In President Putin’s March 18, 2014 speech to
the Duma, he asserted:
Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in
Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend
their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means.
But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure
that these people’s rights and interests are fully protected.
This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and
territorial integrity.399
Russia’s self-defense argument fails to comport with the UN legal
order for two main reasons: (1) no armed attack occurred on Russian
territory; and (2) self-defense may not be invoked for ethnic Russians
living abroad. The reasoning for why the claim of self-defense fails is
similar to the reasoning discussed supra for Georgia. First, the conflict
in Ukraine did not threaten the existence or security of the Russian
state, nor did it concern Russian territory.400 Moreover, the protection
of ethnic Russians may not trigger the right to self-defense.401
Russia also asserted a humanitarian rescue claim to justify its
intervention in Ukraine.402 Similar to the outcome in Georgia, Russia’s
argument for humanitarian rescue also fails since ethnic Russians in
Ukraine are not considered legal Russian nationals. As with Russia’s
“passportization” in Georgia, it is believed that Russia conferred

396

See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 3–4; Marxsen, supra note 333, at 372.
Putin’s Letter on Use of Russian Army in Ukraine Goes to Upper House, TASS (Mar. 1,
2014), http://tass.ru/en/russia/721586.
398
Id.
399
Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.
400
See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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See Lee, supra note 41, at 253, 257; Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374.
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passports and citizenship to Ukrainians in the past several years.403 In
addition to constituting interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs,404
the ICJ has warned that naturalizing a person with little connection to
the naturalizing state should not receive recognition in other states.405
A successful claim for humanitarian rescue requires the state’s
citizens to be facing imminent death.406 During his address, President
Putin expressed concern over the coup d’état in Kyiv that led
Yanukovych to flee into Russia.407 Specifically, President Putin stated:
However, those who stood behind the latest events in
Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet
another government takeover; they wanted to seize power
and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror,
murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and
anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the
tone in Ukraine to this day.408
Despite President Putin’s assertions, no evidence exists that ethnic
Russians in Crimea were in imminent peril.409 Therefore, Russia’s legal
position rooted in self-defense does not meet the UN legal order’s
parameters to justify the threat on the use of force or violation of the
norm of non-intervention.
ii.Intervention by Invitation
Russia also argues that it had the legal right to intervene in
Ukraine because it received Ukraine’s consent through President
Yanukovych.410 Russian authorities assert that after Yanukovych fled
Ukraine as a result of the political unrest, he wrote a letter asking
Russia to intervene in Ukraine against the alleged anti-Semite and
nationalist protesters.411 According to the ICJ, the official government
403

See Vincent M. Artman, Opinion, Annexation by Passport, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 14,
2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/ukraine-russia-crimea
passportizationcitizenship.html; Charles King, Opinion, Crimea, the Tinderbox, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/opinion/crimea-thetinderbox.html?module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Opinion&action=keypress&
region=FixedLeft&pgtype=article.
404
See supra note 296 and accompanying text (concluding that Russia’s
“passportization” policy interfered in Georgia’s internal affairs).
405
See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, ¶¶ 59, 67 (Apr. 6).
406
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
407
See supra notes 363–66 and accompanying text.
408
Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.
409
See Walter Crimea, supra note 273, at 309; see also Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374.
410
Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374.
411
Id.; Scott Neuman, Yanukovych: ‘I Was Wrong’ to Ask Russian Troops into Crimea,
N.P.R. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/04/02/
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of a state may invite foreign states to deploy military troops to its
territory, but an opposition group may not.412 In order to assert such a
claim, Russia must show that Ukraine lawfully consented to
intervention.
Russia must also demonstrate that Yanukovych had legitimate
authority to request Russian intervention to make his invitation
attributable to the state of Ukraine.413 As a preliminary matter,
Yanukovych’s removal from office failed to comply with the Ukrainian
Constitution, which codifies removal procedures.414 Nevertheless,
Yanukovych lacked the authority to consent to Russian intervention
because at the time of his invitation, he had already lost effective
control over Ukraine and lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many
Ukrainians.415 Alternatively, even if Yanukovych possessed the required
authority to consent to Russian intervention, Russia’s argument still
fails because the intervention far exceeded the scope of Yanukovych’s
invitation.416 Russia made no attempt to re-establish Yanukovych’s
regime and instead supported Crimea’s secession.
iii.Russia’s Invocation of Self-Determination
Finally, Russia justified its intervention in Ukraine by broadly
interpreting the principle of self-determination to legitimize Crimea’s
secession from Ukraine.417 As indicated above, self-determination is
one of the main principles of the UN legal order418 and gives a “people”
the right to freely “determine . . . their political status and to pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.”419 When the right
to self-determination is frustrated, a people may secede under certain
circumstances. Two generally agreed upon circumstances include the
colonial context and a people under foreign subjugation.420 Some
argue that when a parent state systemically violates a people’s right to
self-determination, a people are entitled to remedial secession.421 For
example, remedial secession may be appropriate when the parent state
298385578/yanukovych-i-was-wrong-to-ask-russian-troops-into-crimea.
412
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 116, ¶ 246 (June 27).
413
See Marxsen, supra note 333, at 374–75.
414
CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE art. 108 (Uk.).
415
See Marxsen, supra note 333, at 377.
416
Id.
417
See Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.
418
See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
419
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 39.
420
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
421
See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 3.
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commits systemic crimes against humanity or genocide against a
people.422 A large amount of controversy surrounds remedial
secession, however, so its status under international law remains
unclear.423 Nevertheless, Russia asserted that the new Ukrainian
government systemically oppressed Crimeans, therefore leading
Crimea to effectuate lawful remedial secession.424
In legitimizing Crimea’s secession under international law,
President Putin argued that it was “practically impossible to fight
against the will of the people.”425 Russia argued that the Crimeans were
subjected to large-scale oppression by the new Ukrainian government,
characterizing its new members as “neo-Nazis, Russophobes and antiSemites.”426 To illustrate this point, President Putin spoke about a draft
law to revise language policies in Ukraine that aimed to infringe upon
the Russian minority within the state.427 Moreover, President Putin
explained that anyone who opposed the new Ukrainian government
was “threatened with repression” and that Russia could not “abandon
Crimea and its residents in distress.”428 Finally, Russia asserted that
Crimeans made a free, fair, and transparent choice to secede from
Ukraine and join Russia.429 For the purposes of this Comment, it will
be assumed that Crimeans qualify as a “people.”430
As aforementioned, remedial secession may not be a valid avenue
for secession under international law. Assuming, however, that
remedial secession comports with the UN legal order, the
circumstances in Crimea were nowhere near the high threshold
needed to assert such an extraordinary remedy.431 The Ukrainian
Constitution provided a relatively significant degree of political
autonomy.432 Indeed, the right to self-determination is commonly
satisfied through federalism and by breaking a state into provinces with

422

Id.
Indeed, only three instances of remedial secession appear in recent state
practice including: the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002; the independence of
Kosovo in 2008; and the creation of South Sudan in 2011. Id. All of these cases shared
some level of UN involvement.
424
See id. at 6; Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.
425
Putin’s Speech, supra note 8.
426
Id.
427
Id.
428
Id.
429
Burke-White, supra note 59, at 6.
430
See supra note 55 and accompanying text for the most commonly cited
definition of a “people.”
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See Burke-White, supra note 59, at 7; Marxsen, supra note 333, at 383.
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See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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varying degrees of autonomy.433 More significantly, the Ukrainian
government did not systemically oppress Crimeans.434 Ukraine did not
commit large-scale genocide or ethnic cleansing against Crimeans to
warrant the dismemberment of its territory.435 Therefore, the conflict
did not meet the standard required for remedial secession. Since
Crimea failed to legally secede from Ukraine, Russia’s subsequent
annexation is illegal.
C. Commonalities Between Russia’s Legal Rhetoric in Georgia and
Ukraine
Although the series of events in Georgia and Ukraine are distinct,
Russia’s legal arguments for intervention share several common
features. Drawing commonalities between the two conflicts will shed
light on Russia’s overall legal position towards foreign intervention
without state consent. As indicated supra, Russia’s legal justifications
for intervention in Georgia and Ukraine largely fail legal analysis
measuring compliance with the UN legal order. Nevertheless, Russia’s
legal arguments to justify intervention are facially grounded in
international law and the UN legal order specifically.436 The fact that
Russia’s legal justifications comport with the UN legal order on the
surface is still significant to the analysis.
Generally, states conform to international law, but maintain
differing perspectives on the same legal rules.437 Russia interprets the
UN legal order in such a way as to serve its material interests. Often,
“states cloak their actions in legalese to foster reputations of being
lawful actors . . . . A reputation for compliance with international law
is valuable because it allows states to make more credible promises to
other states.”438 Therefore, it is often too risky to unilaterally intervene
in a non-consenting foreign state without any legal support.439 It is
likely that this logic weighs upon Russian decision-makers, and this
desire to ground its actions in international law influences Russia’s
legal perspective on intervention.
Consistency of behavior is
important in the international community,440 so Russia’s overall legal
stance on foreign intervention may adapt to justify actions taken to
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440

Oeter, supra note 393, at 55.
See Marxsen, supra note 333, at 383.
See generally Burke-White, supra note 59, at 8.
See id. at 2.
See VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2007).
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further Russia’s self-interest.441
A good example of Russia morphing its legal perspective to reflect
its material interest is the use of the privileged interests doctrine.
Pursuant to the doctrine, Russia “pay[s] particular attention to the
traditional partners of the Russian Federation.”442 In line with this
belief, Russia argues that its general right of self-defense applies to
protect Russian nationals abroad as if the Russian homeland itself were
under attack.443 Moreover, the argument that Russia may intervene to
rescue ethnic Russians in a foreign state also derives from the
privileged interests doctrine.444 Russia asserted these arguments to
justify its intervention in Georgia and Ukraine despite the differing
factual circumstances of each conflict. Since the privileged interests
doctrine has been incorporated into the Russian legal perspective on
intervention, it is highly likely that Russia will continue to assert the
same legal claims for future interventions in “fraternal” states.
As previously discussed in Part IV, another common theme
between Russia’s legal justifications for Georgia and Ukraine is the use
of Kosovo conflict as precedent.445 Russia recited the ICJ’s holding in
the Kosovo Advisory Opinion which stated that no prohibition on
declarations of independence exist under international law.446 In
President Putin’s March 18, 2014 address he asked:
We keep hearing from the United States and Western
Europe that Kosovo is some special case. What makes it so
special in the eyes of our colleagues? It turns out that it is
the fact that the conflict in Kosovo resulted in so many
human casualties. Is this a legal argument? The ruling of
the International Court says nothing about this. This is not
even double standards; this is amazing, primitive, blunt
cynicism. One should not try so crudely to make everything
suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and
black tomorrow. According to this logic, we have to make
sure every conflict leads to human losses.447
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In fact, the Crimean Declaration of Independence cites the Kosovo
Advisory Opinion as legal authority for independence from Ukraine.448
Despite the fact that Russia vehemently opposed Kosovar
independence, Russia incorporated the outcome into its legal rhetoric
justifying unilateral intervention in Georgia and Ukraine because it
suited Russia’s material interest.
Finally, another area of overlap between Russia’s legal rhetoric in
Georgia and Ukraine relates to potential NATO expansion in both
states. In addition to asserting that Russia has the right to intervene
on behalf of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union states, the
privileged interests doctrine also implicates Russia as the regional
guarantor of security.449 As discussed supra, Russia feels threatened by
eastward NATO expansion. After NATO announced its plans to
incorporate Georgia and Ukraine, Russia did not shy away from voicing
its strong objections.450 In addition to NATO enlargement being
perceived as a security threat to Russia, it also represents the weakening
of Russian authority in its own backyard.451 Thus, for the most part,
Russia wants to keep NATO (and its member states) out of its region
of interest. This is illustrated by Russia’s veto of a 2009 draft Security
Council resolution extending the mandate for the United Nations
Observer Mission in Georgia.452 Russia found the draft resolution
“clearly unacceptable” because it would include foreign peacekeepers
in Georgia as opposed to Russia’s formerly unilateral peacekeeping
control.453 Therefore, Russia has a general distaste for Western
encroachment into its area of privileged interests and will take the
necessary steps to ensure that it maintains its high status within the
region.
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VI. RUSSIA’S OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH THE UN LEGAL
ORDER AND ITS CONTRADICTORY LEGAL POSITION
REGARDING FOREIGN INTERVENTION
State adherence to the UN legal order is important to maintain
international peace and security. Compliance with the UN legal order
allows states to generally predict how other states will behave.454 States
that do not conform to the UN legal order often face the
consequences: “There is likely to be a price to be paid for violations;
and it is not easy to foresee when and where that price will be exacted.
In most cases it is preferable to obey the law and sleep soundly.”455
Therefore, it is no surprise that Russia’s justifications for intervention
in Georgia and Ukraine are based upon international law and the UN
legal order.456
Facially, Russia’s legal arguments to legitimize its breach of the
prohibition on the use of force and the norm of non-intervention in
Georgia and Ukraine conform to the UN legal order. For example, in
both conflicts, Russia asserted the right to self-defense, codified by
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Also, the promotion of human rights is
listed as a purpose of the UN legal order in Article 1; thus, Russia
classified its actions as humanitarian in nature, thereby complying with
its obligations under Article 56 of the UN Charter to further the
purposes of the UN. Further, Russia relied upon one of the UN legal
order’s founding principles of self-determination to support Crimean
independence. These arguments are driven by Russia’s self-interest
and its unique perspective on the UN legal order created in
furtherance of such interests. The fact that Russia proffered these
legal arguments to support its intervention indicates that Russia
attaches some value to conformance with the UN legal order457 and
desires to foster an image of being a lawful actor within the
international system.458
As indicated in Part V, although Russia’s legal arguments set forth
to justify intervention in Georgia and Ukraine seem to comply with the
UN legal order on a surface level, deeper legal analysis yields opposite
results. The majority of these arguments fails under closer scrutiny
and does not meet the required legal parameters pursuant to the UN
legal order. The potential exception to this conclusion is Russia’s
assertion that it acted in self-defense of its peacekeepers stationed in
454
455
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457
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South Ossetia.459 Therefore, Russia’s stance on intervention in Georgia
and Ukraine falls outside of the UN legal order in that regard. This
does not mean, however, that Russia is a rogue state within the
international system that pays no regard to the UN legal order. The
fact of the matter is, much like other great powers, Russia interprets
international law and the UN legal order in its own way. In this
particular instance, though, Russia’s perspective on the state of the law
for foreign intervention does not pass muster.
Russia’s legal perspective upon foreign intervention in the
Security Council, however, is a different story. Seemingly, there is a
night and day difference between the Russia that unilaterally
intervened in Georgia and Ukraine, and the Russia that adopts a more
conservative approach within the Security Council. Using the recent
conflicts in Libya and Syria, Part III discussed how Russia generally
disfavors foreign intervention. As a P5 Member, Russia shows great
deference for state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, and
territorial integrity.460 Generally, Russia objects to foreign intervention
without host state consent and, further, adopts the belief that foreign
intervention often exacerbates domestic unrest.461 Moreover, Russia
seems to strictly adhere to the UN Charter in believing that the Security
Council is the only body with the authority to order intervention in the
domestic affairs of member states.462
Russia’s voting behavior in the context of Libya and Syria
illustrated its conservative approach. For example, Russia became very
displeased with the regime change effectuated by NATO intervention
in Libya. Russia expressed its belief that Western states used the norms
underlying international humanitarian law and R2P as a pretext for
political goals.463 Russia’s dissatisfaction with the outcome in Libya
translated into an even more conservative legal perspective upon
intervention in Syria. In justifying its vetoes for several draft
resolutions addressing the growing violence in the Syrian civil war,
Russia emphasized Syria’s territorial integrity and the principle of nonintervention.464
Russia’s legal stance in the Security Council and its legal
arguments set forth to justify intervention in Georgia and Ukraine are
in clear contradiction. As a P5 Member, Russia champions the
459
460
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protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, but did not
afford Georgia and Ukraine the same level of deference. Russia’s
contradictory legal positions display the nuance in Russia’s overall
perspective on foreign intervention and the UN legal order itself.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment concludes that Russia’s legal position within the
Security Council most accurately reflects its general legal stance
towards foreign intervention. This general legal stance, however,
changes when conflicts arise in Russia’s backyard. As evinced by the
privileged interests doctrine, Russia feels closely connected to postSoviet states. Russia’s legal positions for intervening in Georgia and
Ukraine stem from its belief that it has a sovereign right to maintain
stability within the region. Indeed, Russia possesses a need to maintain
regional power, thereby influencing its perspective upon the UN legal
order and foreign intervention.
Understanding Russia’s legal perspective on intervention is
significant because of Russia’s P5 status within the Security Council.
The Security Council is comprised of diverse states with varying
political agendas. The Security Council’s efficacy is largely dependent
upon the goodwill of other states and the ability of its diverse members
to come to collective decisions. Since Russia is an influential decisionmaker within the Security Council, knowing the circumstances in
which Russia is more (or less) likely to support intervention becomes
valuable in predicting future Security Council action. Without
understanding the reasons behind Russia’s voting behavior and
foreign policy goals, other Security Council members will face great
difficulty in working with Russia to effectuate collective action.
As discussed above, Russia exhibits relatively high sensitivity to
unrest in its near abroad. Thus, it is more likely that Russia will
continue to unilaterally intervene in the domestic affairs of its
neighboring states and will block any potential Security Council
intervention in those states. Unfortunately for Ukraine, this means
that the Security Council will not be coming to its aid to repel the
illegal Russian intervention. At the same time, however, Russia is likely
to maintain its conservative approach towards Security Council
intervention when it involves other regional conflicts, such as the
conflict in Syria. Russia’s conservative approach may partly be
explained by Russia’s desire to keep other foreign powers out of its
area of privileged interests. The more rigorously Russia defends
territorial integrity and the norm of non-intervention, the less likely it
becomes that other states will intervene through collective Security
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Council action.
Therefore, Russia’s legal perspective on the
components of the UN Legal Order identified in Part II is both
reflective of Russia’s legal interpretation of international law and its
material interests.

